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UNTYING THE GORDIAN KNOT:
A PROPOSAL FOR DETERMINING APPLICABILITY OF
THE LAWS OF WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR
Geoffrey S. Corn*
Eric Talbot Jensen**
One of the most difficult legal questions generated by the United States'
proclaimed Global War on Terror is how to determine when, if at all, the laws of
war apply to military operations directed against nonstate actors. This question
has produced a multitude of answers from scholars, government officials,
military legal experts, and even the Supreme Court of the United States.' The
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Army Command and General Staff College, and earned his J.D., highest honors, at George
Washington University and his LL.M., distinguished graduate, at the Judge Advocate General's
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1. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 558, 625-31 (2006) (determining when law of war
applies to military operations directed againsi onstatc actors), su;perseded by statute, Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w), as
recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 985 (D.C. Cir. 2007); JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL31191, TERRORISM AND THE LAW OF WAR: TRYING TERRORISTS
AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE MILITARY COMMISSIONS, at CRS-10 to CRS-16 (2001), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7951.pdf (analyzing whether September l1th attacks
triggered law of war); Sean D. Murphy, International Law, the United States, and the Non-Military
'War' Against Terrorism, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 347, 359-61 (2003) (discussing U.S. government's
attempts to "avoid the application of standard US and international due process norms" when dealing
with suspected terrorists); Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and
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varied responses to this question are almost certainly attributable to the reality
that the criterion for determining when the law of war applies to any given
military operation is based on an assumption that armed conflicts will occur
either between the armed forces of states or between state armed forces and
internal dissident groups.2 Prior to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and
the military response they triggered, the application of this body of law to
military operations directed against nonstate entities outside the territory of the
responding state had not been seriously contemplated. Both proponents and
opponents of application of the laws for war to this struggle relied on this law-
triggering paradigm, derived from articles 2 and 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949. 3 This merely revealed that characterizing the "war on
terror" according to this state-centric paradigm was like putting a proverbial
square peg into a round hole. 4 While from a lay perspective it may seem that
resolving such a question is like dancing on the head of a pin, the resolution has
profound consequences for virtually every person involved in or impacted by this
"war."
Ironically, this state-centric law-triggering paradigm emerged as one of the
most significant post-World War II ("WWII") advances in the laws of war. From
1949 through 2001, this paradigm evolved into almost an article of faith among
the international legal and military community. Accordingly, military operations
were subject to this body of international legal regulation only when the
situation satisfied certain law-triggering "criteria." 5 This paradigm became so
pervasive that at least one major military power felt compelled to establish
military policy requiring compliance with the "principles" of this law during
military operations that did not satisfy this triggering paradigm, a situation that
became increasingly common following the end of the Cold War.6
Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process
in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1340-43 (2004) (same). See generally Derek
Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the "Global War on Terrorism," 46 VA. J. INT'L
L. 165 (2005); Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443
(2007) (discussing how war against terrorist networks such as al Qaeda could impact nature of existing
war conventions).
2. See Waldemar A. Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under
Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 57-61, 63-65 (1983) (explaining
norms determining armed conflict and status of combatants).
3. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to
Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 295, 323-25, 329 (2007)
(noting how both President Bush and Supreme Court relied on Common Articles 2 and 3 to reach
opposite conclusions about applicability of Geneva Conventions to post-9/11 conflict).
4. Id. at 329.
5. See id. at 300-10 (discussing use of Geneva Convention triggers for determining whether laws
of war apply).
6. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No. 2311.011E, DoD LAW
OF WAR PROGRAM para. 4.1 (2006), available at http://www.dtic.millwhs/directives/
corres/pdf/231101p.pdf (mandating that "[m]embers of the DoD Components comply with the law of
war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military
operations"); see also CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJSCI 5810.01C, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OF WAR
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The utility of this paradigm was, however, truly thrown into disarray as the
result of the events of September 11, 2001. President Bush characterized the
terror strike against the United States as an "armed conflict,"'7 and he and the
Congress of the United States almost immediately invoked the war powers of the
nation to respond to the threat presented by al Qaeda, a nonstate entity
operating throughout the world.8 This characterization was embraced not only
by the United Nations Security Council, 9 but also by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization t° and others. 1 Since that time, the executive branch has struggled
to articulate, and in many judicial challenges defend, how it could invoke the
authorities of war without accepting the obligations of the law regulating war.12
Unfortunately, responding to such questions by application of the traditional
law-triggering paradigm was like fitting a square peg into a round hole.' 3
PROGRAM para. 4(a) (2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs directives/cdata/unlimit/581001.pdf
(using same words as Directive to describe when armed forces are to "comply with the law of war").
7. Military Order of November 13,2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16,2001).
8. See Jayshree Bajoria, al-Qaeda (a.k.a al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida), CFR.ORG, Apr. 18, 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9126/ (discussing origins, structure, and goals of al Qaeda).
9. See S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (calling for international
response to "terrorist attacks"); S.C. Res. 1368, 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001)
(condemning September 11th attacks as "threat to international peace and security").
10. See Press Release, N. At. Treaty Org., Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12,
2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm (stating that if 9/11 attacks were
"directed from abroad against the United States," such terrorist attacks would constitute "armed
attack" requiring international response).
11. See Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
905, 909-10 (2002) (collecting responses from other organizations).
12. See generally Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22,
2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee12202mem.pdf (containing executive
branch's analysis and conclusion that al Qaeda and Taliban operatives are not subject to Geneva
Convention); Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to George W. Bush,
President of the United States, on Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of
War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at
http://news.lp.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/torture/gnzlsl2502mem2gwb.html (same); Memorandum from
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def., to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S.
Dep't of Def., Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda (Jan. 19, 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/11902mem.pdf (summarizing past analysis). In a message
dated January 19, 2002, the Chairman nutified combatant commanders of the Secretary of Defense's
determination. Message from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Status of Taliban and Al
Qaida 1 (Jan. 19, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/12202mem.pdf
(announcing Secretary Rumsfeld's determination that captured Taliban forces were not entitled to
prisoner of war status under Geneva Conventions). This determination endorsed the analysis provided
by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice to the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense that reflected a restrictive interpretation of legal applicability of the laws of
war. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, Humane Treatment of
Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees 2 (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.pegc.us
archive/WhiteHouse/bushmemo_20020207_ed.pdf.
13. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Williams, J., concurring)
(articulating difficulties in applying Geneva Convention's language to war on terror), rev'd, 548 U.S.
2008]
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Because of this disarray, the time has come to develop a new approach to
determining application of the laws of war that reconciles this disparity between
authority and obligation related to the conduct of combat military operations.
This will require adopting a new triggering "criteria." This trigger must reflect
not only the underlying purpose of the laws of war, but also the pragmatic
realities of contemporary military operations.
As nations prepare to use military force, national leaders dictate rules on
how the military may apply force in any impending operation. These rules,
broadly categorized as rules of engagement ("ROE"), 14 fall into two general
categories: conduct-based ROE that allow military personnel to respond with
force based on an individual's actions,15 and status-based ROE that allow
military personnel to use deadly force based only on an individual's membership
in a designated organization, regardless of the individuals actions. 16 It is the
thesis of this Article that a nation's adoption of status-based ROE for its military
in a particular military operation should constitute the trigger requiring that
nation and its military to apply the laws of war to that operation.
This Article will initially discuss the historical underlying purpose of
regulating conflict, and why that purpose supports an expansive application of
the laws of war. It will then explain why the current law-triggering test is
insufficient to respond to the realities of contemporary transnational conflict
between states and nonstate organizations. The Article will then provide a
comprehensive discussion of the concept of rules of engagement, including how
they evolved to complement application of the laws of war. More importantly,
557 (2006). Judge Williams' explanation exemplifies the challenge associated with applying the laws of
war to the war on terror:
Non-state actors cannot sign an international treaty. Nor is such an actor even a "Power"
that would be eligible under Article 2 (91 3) to secure protection by complying with the
Convention's requirements. Common Article 3 fills the gap, providing some minimal
protection for such non-eligibles in an "armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." The gap being filled is the
non-eligible party's failure to be a nation. Thus the words "not of an international character"
are sensibly understood to refer to a conflict between a signatory nation and a non-state
actor. The most obvious form of such a conflict is a civil war. But given the Convention's
structure, the logical reading of "international character" is one that matches the basic
derivation of the word "international," i.e., between nations. Thus, I think the context
compels the view that a conflict between a signatory and a non-state actor is a conflict "not
of an international character." In such a conflict, the signatory is bound to Common Article
3's modest requirements of "humane[]" treatment and "the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."
Id. (alteration in original).
14. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ET AL., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY
AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, at 476 (rev. ed. 2008), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/el/new-pubs/jpl02.pdf (providing DoD standardized definition of "rules
of engagement") [hereinafter DoD DICTIONARY].
15. See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text for an explanation of when conduct-based
ROE are applicable in determining whether to use force.
16. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text for a discussing of when it is appropriate to
invoke status-based ROE in using force.
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the Article will explain how, in practice, rules of engagement fall into two broad
categories: status or conduct rules. The distinction between these two categories
of ROE will, as this Article demonstrates, offer a new analytical criterion for
triggering the law, relying on a nation's invocation of status-based ROE. The
Article will accordingly analyze how focusing on the rules of engagement related
to military operations offers perhaps the best de facto indicator of the line
between conflict and nonconflict operations, and therefore is the best triggering
criterion for legally mandated application of the fundamental principles of the
laws of war. The Article will conclude with a proposal for adoption of this new
law-triggering paradigm, and a discussion of some pragmatic policy concerns that
will need to be carefully considered in any such adoption.
I. HISTORICAL UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF REGULATING CONFLICT, AND WHY
THAT PURPOSE SUPPORTS AN EXPANSIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAWS OF WAR
17
As long as there has been conflict, there have also been attempts to limit or
control that conflict.'8 The focus of these attempts has ranged from a desire to
increase military effectiveness to concerns for the victims of conflict. Over time,
this body of conflict regulation has come to be known as the laws of war, the law
of armed conflict, or, more recently, international humanitarian law. This Part
will briefly chart the historical underpinnings of these laws19 and demonstrate
that they serve three broad purposes: (1) "protecting both combatants and
noncombatants from unnecessary suffering," (2) "safeguarding all persons who
fall into the hands of an enemy," and (3) helping with the reestablishment of
peace.20
Many ancient civilizations developed detailed rules to regulate armed
conflict,21 including the Chinese,22 Romans, 23 Babylonians, Hittites, Persians,
17. For further background on the historical bases for regulating conflict, see generally Eric
Talbot Jensen, The ICI's "Uganda Wall": A Barrier to the Principle of Distinction and an Entry Point
for Lawfare, 35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 241,244-51 (2007).
18. Gregory P. Noone, The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War 11, 47
NAVAL L. REV. 176, 182-85 (2000) (asserting that laws regulating conflict have developed in almost
every culture).
19. See generally Howard S. Levie, History of the Law of War on Land, 838 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 339 (2000), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQHG (discussing
modern attempts to codify conduct and limitations in law of war).
20. INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 12 (John
Rawcliffe ed., 2007) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK].
21. William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September I 1th Proposal to Rationalize the
Laws of War, 73 Miss. L.J. 639, 641 n.12 (2004); Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The
Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 60 n.37 (1994);
Noone, supra note 18, at 182-85.
22. For an example of an early Chinese work about military strategy, see generally SUN TZu,
THE ART OF WAR 76 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1963) (n.d.).
23. See Thomas C. Wingfield, Chivalry in the Use of Force, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 111, 113-14 (2001)
(explaining role of Roman law in shaping law of war during Age of Chivalry).
2008)
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and Greeks.24 This effort continued in the Age of Chivalry, when fighters formed
complex rules concerning plunder 25 and siege,26 assassination, 27 the distinction
between ruses and perfidy,28 and ransom 29 and parole.30 As states began to
employ professional armies and hostilities grew in scale and breadth, the need
for laws governing what happened on the battlefield also grew with a more
focused intensity. 31
This need started an age of law of war codification that generated numerous
conventions and agreements that still regulate armed conflict today. The 1863
Lieber Code,32 the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg,33 the unratified Brussels
Conference of 1874, 34 the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907,35 and the 1909
Naval Conference of London 36 are a few prominent examples of this codification
trend. Because most of these burgeoning principles related to the regulation of
24. See Noone, supra note 18, at 182-85 (describing conflict-regulating laws in different ancient
civilizations).
25. See Wingfield, supra note 23, at 115-16 (describing mechanics and rules of plundering).
26. See id. at 117-19 (describing rules of siege).
27. See Kristen Eichensehr, On the Offensive: Assassination Policy Under International Law,
HARV. INT'L REV., Fall 2003, at 36, 36 (describing ancient roots of international agreements
prohibiting assassination).
28. See Wingfield, supra note 23, at 131 (presenting rationales used in attempts to distinguish
ruses from acts of perfidy).
29. See Scott R. Morris, The Laws of War: Rules by Warriors for Warriors, ARMY LAW., Dec.
1997, at 4, 4 (explaining that practice of keeping battlefield captives alive for ransom was traditionally
based on "fiscal" rather than "humanitarian" reasons); Wingfield, supra note 23, at 116-17 (describing
how "law of ransom" operated during Middle Ages).
30. See Gary D. Brown, Prisoner of War Parole: Ancient Concept, Modern Utility, 156 MIL. L.
REV. 200, 201-08 (1998) (discussing development of parole from days of ancient Carthaginian
civilization through World War II).
31. See Nathan A. Canestaro, "Small Wars" and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the Insurgents
in Iraq, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73,81-87 (2004) (detailing evolution of law of war).
32. Dietrich Schindler & Jiff Toman, Introductory Note to Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3,3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jif'i Toman eds., 3d
rev. and completed ed. 1988). An analysis of the provisions of the document, commonly called the
Lieber Instructions or the Lieber Code, shows that it clearly "acknowledge[s] the supremacy of the
warrior's utilitarian requirements even though explicitly referring to the need to balance military
necessity with humanitarian concerns." Eric S. Krauss & Mike 0. Lacey, Utilitarian vs. Humanitarian:
The Battle over the Law of War, PARAMETERS, Summer 2002, at 73,76.
33. Dietrich Schindler & Jiffi Toman, Introductory Note to Declaration Renouncing the Use, in
Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 32, at 101, 101. This document is commonly referred to as the Declaration of
St. Petersburg.
34. Dietrich Schindler & Jifi Toman, Introductory Note to Brussels Conference of 1874, in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 32, at 25, 25.
35. Dietrich Schindler & Jiff Toman, Introductory Note to Convention (II) with Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTs, supra note 32, at 63, 63. These documents are typically
referred to as the Hague Conventions.
36. Dietrich Schindler & Jiff Toman, Introductory Note to Naval Conference of London, in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 32, at 843, 843.
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warfare were ultimately codified in the Hague Convention of 1907, the type of
battlefield regulation embodied in this treaty came to be known as the "Hague
tradition." 37 The principles of the Hague Tradition were focused on the fighters
and tied to the practicalities of war.38 Accordingly, George Aldrich has written,
"The 1907 Hague Regulations contain very few provisions designed to protect
civilians from the effects of hostilities. Aside from the prohibition on the
employment of poison or poisoned weapons, which was primarily intended to
protect combatants, the only such rules are Articles 25-28." 39
Concurrent with the development of the Hague rules was the beginning of a
growing concern for the victims of war, comprising both combatants who were
out of the fight and civilians who were never part of the fight. Beginning with
Henri Dunant's experience at the 1859 Battle of Solferino,40 and the subsequent
37. Derek Jinks and David Sloss discuss the differences between the Geneva and Hague
traditions:
The jus in bello is ... subdivided into Geneva law and Hague law. Comprised principally of
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 Additional Protocols, Geneva law is a
detailed body of rules concerning the treatment of victims of armed conflict. Embodied
principally in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, Hague law prescribes the acceptable
means and methods of warfare, particularly with regard to tactics and general conduct of
hostilities. Though Geneva law and Hague law overlap, the terminology distinguishes two
distinct regimes: one governing the treatment of persons subject to the enemy's authority
(Geneva law), and the other governing the treatment of persons subject to the enemy's
lethality (Hague law). International humanitarian law embraces the whole jus in bello, in
both its Geneva and Hague dimensions.
Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
97,108-09 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
38. See Louise Doswald-Beck, Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Future
Wars, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 39,42 (Michael N. Schmitt &
Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (arguing that advance in weapons technology also drove States to try and
enact laws to limit warfare).
39. George H. Aldrich, The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 50 (2000) (footnote
omitted). Aldrich continues:
Article 25 forbids the bombardment "of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are
undefended." By undefended, it was clear that the article meant that there were no
defending armed forces in the town or other area in question or between it and the attacking
force and consequently that it was open for capture by the attacker. It clearly did not apply
to towns, villages, and so forth, that were in the hinterland and consequently were not open
to immediate capture-or, in 1907, even to bombardment. Essentially, the article was a
cG, .. onsense probihition against bombarding something that could be taken without cost to
the attacker.
Articles 26 and 27 were precautionary measures, and neither suggests that its primary
object was to minimize civilian casualties, although they might have provided some
beneficial incidental effects for civilians in places under siege or bombardment. Article 28,
which prohibits pillage, protects civilians only after the fall of the town or place and was
necessary to make clear that the ancient custom permitting pillage of places that had resisted
sieges was no longer acceptable.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
40. International Committee of the Red Cross, From the Battle of Solferino to the Eve of the
First World War, http://www.icrc.org/web/englsiteengO.nsf/htmlall/57JNVP (last visited Apr. 30, 2009)
(providing concise history of Dunant, including Battle of Solferino).
2008]
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formation of the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), the world
began to consider the plight of war victims, particularly the wounded and sick on
the battlefield. By 1864, the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded in Armies in the Field4' was signed, followed by its
accompanying Additional Articles of 1868.42 This convention was followed by
the 1906 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armies in the Field.43 Much like the Hague tradition, with the ICRC
headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, this new humanitarian-centered focus
became known as the "Geneva tradition.""
When WWII ravaged much of the world, it demonstrated the need to
update the laws of war to increase protections not only for combatants, but
civilians, as well.45 "At the end of the nineteenth century, the overwhelming
percentage of those killed or wounded in war were military personnel. Toward
the end of the twentieth century, the great majority of persons killed or injured
in most international armed conflicts have been civilian noncombatants. ' '46 The
nations of the world responded to this great destruction with the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. 47 While the first three Geneva Conventions 48 built upon
preexisting established principles that survived WWII and were aimed at the
protection of sick or wounded warriors, a new treaty, Convention (IV) relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,49 granted extensive
41. Dietrich Schindler & Jifl Toman, Introductory Note to Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 32,
at 279, 279.
42. Dietrich Schindler & Jiff Toman, Introductory Note to Additional Articles Relating to the
Condition of the Wounded in War, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 32, at 285,285.
43. Dietrich Schindler & Jiff Toman, Introductory Note to Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra
note 32, at 301,301.
44. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 37, at 108-09.
45. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 344
tbl.504 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/defense.pdf (showing U.S.
death toll disparity between World Wars I and II).
46. Aldrich, supra note 39, at 48.
47. See Bradford, supra note 21, at 765-71 (discussing enactment of four treaties following
WWII).
48. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I] (updating earlier conventions on treatment of wounded and sick soldiers); Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]
(applying standards of convention on wounded and sick soldiers to fighting at sea); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III] (instituting minimum standards for treatment of captured
enemy troops).
49. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. Eric Krauss and Mike Lacey
describe the importance of this treaty:
Previous conventions had forced the utilitarians to deal with issues such as the treatment of
the sick and wounded and prisoners of war--duties which most utilitarians saw as part of
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protections to civilians considered to be victims of war, including those in the
hands of an enemy.50 The overall goal of the four conventions was the
advancement of humanitarian law by enlarging the reach of the law of war.51
The trend to enlarge the coverage of the laws of armed conflict continued as
a result of the deadly armed conflicts that occurred after WWII. In 1977, the
ICRC sponsored the completion of two Additional Protocols5 2 that expanded on
the prior Geneva Conventions. They not only brought the Geneva Conventions
up to modern expectations, but for the first time showed a merging of the
Geneva and Hague traditions.5 3 For example, Part IV of Additional Protocol I is
titled "Civilian Population" but contains some of the most important
contemporary regulation of target selection and engagement, subjects
theretofore reserved almost exclusively to the Hague tradition.54
The laws of armed conflict have also been modified considerably to affect
specific weapons, for example, by the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its additional
protocols,55 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.56
Some of these regulations have been passed without much deference to the
their "warrior code" anyway. The Civilian Convention for the first time placed affirmative
obligations upon the utilitarian warrior class to address the food, shelter, and health-care
needs of civilians in an occupied area.
Krauss & Lacey, supra note 32, at 77.
50. Jensen, supra note 17, at 244-51.
51. Krauss & Lacey, supra note 32, at 77.
52. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument [hereinafter Additional Protocol I];
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-2,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, available at http:l/www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfFULLJ475?OpenDocument [hereinafter
Additional Protocol II].
53. James D. Fry, Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of Warfare: Cave
Combat and International Humanitarian Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 453,466 (2006).
54. See general!y Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, "We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the
Law": A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL iNT'L L.J. 2 3 3, (2003)
(examining targeted killings of suspected terrorists in context of Additional Protocol I); Albert S.
Janin, Engaging Civilian-Belligerents Leads to Self-Defense/Protocol I Marriage, ARMY LAW., July
2007, at 82; Mark David Maxwell & Richard V. Meyer, The Principle of Distinction: Probing the Limits
ofIts Customariness, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2007, at 1 (using Additional Protocol I to analyze how soldiers
should distinguish between civilians and combatants).
55. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols), Oct. 10,
1980,1342 U.N.T.S. 137.
56. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997,2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
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military's desire to maintain the weapon's wartime capability. 57 Nevertheless, the
governments of many nations have embraced continued development of the law
of armed conflict in order to increase its applicability and coverage because it
supports the purposes of the law of war.
The merging and expansion of the Hague and Geneva traditions not only
adds to the protections for combatants, noncombatants, and civilians on the
battlefield, but also those who are in the hands of an enemy. In doing so, it also
supports the quicker restoration of peace. The expansive application of the laws
of war is a trend based in history and supportive of the modern political climate.
II. CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION: THE INHERENT INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO DETERMINING APPLICABILITY OF THE LAWS OF
WAR58
A thorough appreciation of the historical underpinnings of the laws of war
demonstrates the critical importance of providing a regulatory framework for the
execution of combat operations. Accordingly, asserting that armed conflict must
be subject to such a framework becomes almost axiomatic. However, as noted
above, the rapid evolution of the nature of warfare exemplified by the post-9/11
Global War on Terror has outpaced the evolution of the legal triggers for
application of this regulatory framework. As a result, nations and the armed
forces called upon to execute combat operations in their name confront
increasing uncertainty as to the applicability of the laws of war to their
operations, an uncertainty frequently resulting in policy-based application of law
of war principles.59
That such uncertainty exists seems inconsistent with the intent of the
drafters of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. One of the most important aspects
of these four treaties was the rejection of a legally formalistic approach to
determining application of the laws of war in favor of a pragmatic trigger, an
effort inspired by the perceived "law avoidance" that occurred during WWII by
characterizing armed conflicts as falling outside the legal definition of "war." 6
57. See id. pmbl. (focusing on harmful impact on civilians and not mentioning weapon's military
utility); cf INT'L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2008: TOwARD A MINE-
FREE WORLD (2008) (describing, in purely humanitarian terms, global effort to ban landmines).
58. For further analysis of the insufficiency of the current law-triggering paradigm to address
issues related to transnational armed conflicts, see Corn, supra note 3, at 300-11.
59. See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 6, at para. 4(a) (providing that
U.S. armed forces will comply with law of war at all times, regardless of how conflicts are
characterized, unless directed otherwise); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 6, at para. 4.1 (requiring all
members of Department of Defense to comply with law of war at all times, regardless of how conflict
is characterized).
60. 3 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 22-23 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter ICRC
COMMENTARY]. The ICRC Commentary offers additional background for this emphasis on de facto
hostilities as a trigger for the protections of the Conventions:
The Hague Convention of 1899, in Article 2, stated that the annexed Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land were applicable "in case of war". This
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The method adopted by the international community in 1949 to accomplish this
objective of preventing "law avoidance" was to develop a law-triggering
mechanism based on the de facto existence of hostilities. Accordingly, the
Geneva Conventions provide that the full corpus of the treaties come into effect
during any "armed conflict" of an international character (interstate armed
conflicts); 61 and that the more limited regulation provided by Common Article 3
to the treaties comes into effect during any armed conflict not of an international
character 62 (understood at that time to mean intrastate armed conflicts).63 While
definition was not repeated either in 1907 at The Hague or in 1929 at Geneva; the very title
and purpose of the Conventions made it clear that they were intended for use in war-time,
and the meaning of war seemed to require no defining.... Since 1907 experience has shown
that many armed conflicts, displaying all the characteristics of a war, may arise without being
preceded by any of the formalities laid down in the Hague Convention. Furthermore, there
have been many cases where Parties to a conflict have contested the legitimacy of the enemy
Government and therefore refused to recognize the existence of a state of war. In the same
way, the temporary disappearance of sovereign States as a result of annexation or
capitulation has been put forward as a pretext for not observing one or other of the
humanitarian Conventions. It was necessary to find a remedy to this state of affairs and the
change which had taken place in the whole conception of such Conventions pointed the
same way. The Geneva Conventions are coming to be regarded less and less as contracts
concluded on a basis of reciprocity in the national interests of the parties, and more and
more as a solemn affirmation of principles respected for their own sake, a series of
unconditional engagements on the part of each of the Contracting Parties vis-A-vis the
others.
Id. at 19-20.
61. Geneva Convention I, supra note 48, art. 2; Geneva Convention II, supra note 48, art. 2;
Geneva Convention III, supra note 48, art. 2; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 49, art. 2. Each of
these Conventions includes the following identical article:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Geneva Convention I, supra note 48, art. 2; Geneva Convention II, supra note 48, art. 2; Geneva
Convention III, supra note 48, art. 2; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 49, art. 2.
62. Geneva Convention I, supra note 48, art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 48, art. 3;
Geneva Convention III, supra note 48, art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 49, art. 3. Each of
these Conventions includes the following identical article:
in tU casc of arned conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the following provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention,
or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other
similar criteria.
Geneva Convention I, supra note 48, art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 48, art. 3; Geneva
Convention III, supra note 48, art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 49, art. 3.
63. See supra note 73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the evolving definition of
intrastate conflicts. The following explains this paradigm:
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these law triggers technically relate only to the treaty provisions to which they
are connected, over time they evolved into the customary international law
triggers for the law of armed conflict writ large.64
The significance of these law triggers for purposes of this Article is not that
transnational counterterrorism operations fall into either the interstate or
intrastate armed conflict categories. Indeed, it was the fact that these operations
fell into a proverbial twilight zone between these two types of armed conflicts
that formed the basis for the Bush administration's denial of Geneva protections
for captured al Qaeda operatives. 65 The significance lies in the determined
efforts of the international community to ensure that, in future conflicts, the
regulatory framework of the law of armed conflict could not be disavowed once
a de facto situation of armed conflict existed. Accordingly, relying on these law-
triggering provisions as a basis to deny applicability of this regulatory framework
to a situation claimed to fall into the category of armed conflict represented a
perversion of the spirit and intent of this fundamental advancement of the law. 66
The reality that evolved after 1949 did not, however, necessarily implement
this spirit and purpose. Instead, the geographic context of armed conflicts
became as decisive to law applicability as did the existence of armed conflict
itself. Accordingly, unless a conflict could be pigeonholed into what one of the
Authors has characterized elsewhere as the interstate/intrastate "either/or" law-
triggering paradigm,67 applicability of the law was rejected. This paradigm is
reflected in the following excerpt from a presentation by an ICRC Legal
Adviser:
Humanitarian law recognizes two categories of armed conflict -
international and non-international. Generally, when a State resorts to
To understand why endorsing a new category of armed conflict-transnational armed
conflict-is the necessary answer to respond to the realities of contemporary military
operations, it is first necessary to understand the limitations inherent in the traditional
Geneva Convention-based law-triggering paradigm. This paradigm is based on Common
Articles 2 and 3 of these four treaties. Common Article 2 defines the triggering event for
application of the full corpus of the laws of war: international armed conflict. Common
Article 3, in contrast, provides that the basic principle of humane treatment is applicable in
non-international armed conflicts occurring in the territory of a signatory state. Although
neither of these treaty provisions explicitly indicate that they serve as the exclusive triggers
for application of the laws of war, they rapidly evolved to create such an effect. As a result,
these two treaty provisions have been long understood as establishing the definitive law-
triggering paradigm. In accordance with this paradigm, application of the laws of war has
always been contingent on two essential factors: first, the existence of armed conflict and
second, the nature of the armed conflict.
Corn, supra note 3, at 300-02 (footnotes omitted).
64. See INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN'S SCH., THE LAW OF WAR
WORKSHOP DESKBOOK 13-24 (Brian J. Bill ed., 2000) (discussing legal justifications for armed
conflict).
65. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the characterization of al
Qaeda as an armed attacker and the stance of the U.N. Security Council.
66. See generally Corn, supra note 3 (discussing need to update law-triggering paradigm to reflect
modern realities of war).
67. Id. at 308.
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force against another State (for example, when the "war on terror"
involves such use of force, as in the recent U.S. and allied invasion of
Afghanistan) the international law of international armed conflict
applies. When the "war on terror" amounts to the use of armed force
within a State, between that State and a rebel group, or between rebel
groups within the State, the situation may amount to non-international
armed conflict .... 68
This interpretation of the law not only formed the foundation of Bush
administration interpretations in relation to the U.S. military response to the
terror attacks of September 11,69 but did then and continues to play a central
role in the assertion by some experts and governments that the law of armed
conflict cannot apply to transnational counterterror military operations (unless
those operations are part of a broader interstate armed conflict, such as U.S.
operations in Afghanistan).70
If, as suggested herein, the ultimate purpose of the drafters of the Geneva
Conventions was to prevent "law avoidance" by developing de facto law
triggers-a purpose consistent with the humanitarian foundation of the
treaties-then the myopic focus on the geographic nature of an armed conflict in
the context of transnational counterterror combat operations serves to frustrate
that purpose. These combat operations fall in a gap between the understood
meaning of international and noninternational armed conflicts, because they are
not conflicts resulting from disputes between states,71 nor are they confined to
the territory of the responding state. Thus, when one state uses combat power
against an organized terrorist group in another state, and one or both states
denies that it is involved in the armed conflict with the other (such as the 2006
Israeli intervention in Lebanon to destroy Hezbollah forces), uncertainty exists
as to whether the armed conflict is "international" within the meaning of the
law.72 And, because such operations occur outside the responding state's
territory, they certainly are not intrastate.
73
68. Gabor Rona, Legal Adviser, ICRC, Presentation at the Workshop on the Protection of
Human Rights While Countering Terrorism: When Is a War Not a War? - The Proper Role of the Law
of Armed Conflict in the "Global War on Terror" (Mar. 16, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.icrc.orgfWeb/Eng/siteeng0.nsfliwpList575/3C2914F52152E565C1256E60005C84C0).
69. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Bush administration and
U.N. Security Council's characterization of al Qaeda.
70. See, e.g., UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3.1
(2004) (limiting application of law of armed conflict to situations in which "the armed forces of a state
are in conflict with those of another state"). But see Rona, supra note 68 (rejecting idea that
international humanitarian law does not apply to war on terror).
71. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 60, at 32 (discussing difficulties in coming to consensus
about applicability of Geneva Conventions to conflicts that are not traditional civil wars or interstate
conflicts).
72. "This 'hostilities without dispute' theory was clearly manifest in the recent conflict in
Lebanon, where neither Israel nor Lebanon took the position that the hostilities fell into the category
of international armed conflict." Corn, supra note 3, at 305; see also Statement by Group of Eight
Leaders - G-8 Summit 2006 (July 16, 2006), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
MFAArchive/2000_2009/2006/Statement%20by%20Group%20of%20Eight%2OLeaders%20-%20G-
8%20Summit%202006%2016-Jul-2006 (describing conflict between Israel and terrorist organization
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It therefore becomes apparent why this "either/or" law-triggering paradigm
fails to address the reality of extraterritorial counterterror combat operations
conducted outside the territory of the responding state. These operations cannot
be characterized as international armed conflicts within the meaning of Common
Article 2 because they fail to satisfy the interstate predicate. As for Common
Article 3, although they are certainly "non-international" as the result of the fact
that they are not "interstate," because they occur outside the territory of the
responding state they fail to satisfy the "within the territory of the High
Contracting Party" qualifier of Common Article 3, a qualifier that based on the
drafting history of the article is properly understood as limiting Common Article
3 conflicts to those that are truly intrastate. This interstate/intrastate
understanding of the Geneva Convention law-triggering paradigm was pervasive
prior to the initiation of the U.S. military response to the terror attacks of
September 11. As a result, the characterization of this military response as an
"armed conflict" between the United States and a transnational terrorist group
exposed a regulatory lacuna created by the Common Article 2/3 law-triggering
paradigm. It was clear that the law had failed to account for determining what
regulatory framework should or does in fact apply to such operations, typified by
not only the U.S. military response to these attacks but also the subsequent
Israeli assault on Hezbollah. These operations reveal the existence of this
regulatory gap74 and the legal uncertainty it produces. 75 Ironically, however, the
based in Lebanon). However, "this was not the first example of the use of such a theory to avoid the
acknowledgement of an international armed conflict. In fact, the U.S. intervention in Panama in 1989
represents perhaps the quintessential example of [this] theory of 'applicability avoidance' due to the
absence of the requisite dispute between nations." Corn, supra note 3, at 305. The United States
executed the intervention to remove General Manuel Noriega from power in Panama and destroy the
Panamanian Defense Force-the regular armed forces of Panama. RONALD H. COLE, OFFICE OF THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OPERATION JUST CAUSE: THE PLANNING AND
EXECUTION OF JOINT OPERATIONS IN PANAMA, FEBRUARY 1988-JANUARY 1990 1-3 (1995), available
at http://www.dtic.milldoctrine/jel/history/ustcaus.pdf. "Operation Just Cause involved the use of
more than 20,000 U.S. forces who engaged in intense combat with the Panamanian Defense Forces."
Corn, supra note 3, at 305. However, "the United States asserted that the conflict did not qualify as an
international armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article 2. The basis for this assertion was
the fact that General Noriega was not the legitimate leader of Panama," therefore the United States
dispute with him did not qualify as a dispute with Panama. Id. (footnote omitted). "Although this
rationale was ultimately rejected by the U.S. district court that adjudicated Noriega's claim to prisoner
of war status, it is" not the only example of the emphasis "of a lack of a dispute between states as a
basis for denying the existence of a Common Article 2 inter-state conflict." Id. (footnote omitted); see
also United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 794 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (discussing argument for denying role
to Common Article 2 in Noriega's case).
73. See Corn, supra note 3, at 307 & n.38 (examining evolution of interpretation of Common
Article 3 from origins to post-September 11 applications).
74. See ELSEA, supra note 1, at CRS-10 to CRS-16 (analyzing whether attacks of September 11,
2001 triggered law of war); Kirby Abbott, Terrorists: Combattants [sic], Criminals, or... ?-The Current
State of International Law, in THE MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFECTIVENESS, FAIRNESS
AND VALIDITY 366, 366-70 (2004) (discussing difficulty of determining what law applies in War on
Terror context); Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in
Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-9 (2004) (discussing complex challenge of
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existence of this gap does not prove that regulation in this context is not
required. In fact, the policy response to the reality of this gap in legal coverage
reveals that professional armed forces consider an unregulated operational
environment fundamentally inconsistent with disciplined military operations. 76
Furthermore, the pragmatic recognition that all armed conflicts must be subject
to the regulatory principles of the law of armed conflict has been central to the
Supreme Court's rejection of the "regulatory gap" interpretation of the law
central to the government position in war on terror cases. The most profound
example of this is certainly the Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 77 But
even before that case reached the Court, this logic was embraced by the
concurring judge in the lower court endorsement of the Bush position that
brought the case to the Supreme Court. In the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
decision,78 Judge Williams responded to the majority's reasoning that, because
the President determined that the conflict is of international scope but is not
interstate, Common Article 3 is therefore inapplicable to armed conflict with al
Qaeda:
Non-State actors cannot sign an international treaty. Nor is such an
actor even a "Power" that would be eligible under Article 2 (T 3) to
secure protection by complying with the Convention's requirements.
Common Article 3 fills the gap, providing some minimal protection for
such non-eligibles in an "armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties." The gap being filled is the non-eligible party's failure to be a
nation. Thus the words "not of an international character" are sensibly
understood to refer to a conflict between a signatory nation and a non-
state actor. The most obvious form of such a conflict is a civil war. But
given the Convention's structure, the logical reading of "international
character" is one that matches the basic derivation of the word
"international," i.e., between nations. Thus, I think the context compels
the view that a conflict between a signatory and a non-state actor is a
conflict "not of an international character." In such a conflict, the
signatory is bound to Common Article 3's modest requirements of
"humane[]" treatment and "the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. '79
conflict categorization related to military operations conducted against highly organized nonstate
groups with transnational reach).
15. See Lebaion/7rae!: U.N Rights Body Squanders Chance to Help Civilians, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Aug. 11, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/11/1ebano!3969txi.iiti-, (dcneuncing
Human Rights Council's decision to investigate abuses committed by Israel but not those perpetrated
by Hezbollah); U.N.: Open Independent Inquiry into Civilian Deaths, HUMAN RiGHTS WATCH, Aug. 7,
2006, http:/Ihrw.orglenglish/docs/2006/O8/08/lebanol3939.htm (noting that Kofi Annan, Secretary-
General of the United Nations, called for investigation into effects of conflict on civilians in Israel and
Lebanon).
76. See Corn, supra note 3, at 311-15 (discussing policy-mandated application of fundamental law
of armed conflict principles to situations that do not trigger legal application of these principles).
77. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
78. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33,44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
79. Id. (Williams, J., concurring).
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Although this argument seems to provide a compelling recognition that the
critical trigger for application of the law was a government assertion of authority
based on a theory of armed conflict and that no armed conflict should be
unregulated, Judge Williams was unable to convince his peers to adopt this
interpretation. This reflects the pervasive impact of the Common Article 2 and 3
"either/or" law-triggering paradigm on conflict regulation analysis. It is simply
inescapable that such a pragmatic interpretation of these law triggers is
fundamentally inconsistent with the evolved interpretation of these articles, a
reality borne out by the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, where the Court was essentially evenly divided on the proper
interpretation of Common Articles 2 and 3.80 But as Judge Williams and the
Hamdan Supreme Court decision recognized, "it is fundamentally inconsistent
with the logic of the law of war to detach the applicability of regulation from the
necessity for regulation.""l A pragmatic reconciliation of these two
considerations, one that ensured that conflict dictates application of law, not that
law dictates what is a conflict, was needed.
But pragmatism only reaches so far. The law of armed conflict is
indisputably a lex specialis, and as such does not and cannot apply at all times to
all situations. Nor can it simply apply to all military operations, for many such
operations cannot under any legitimate definition be characterized as armed
conflicts. Accordingly, to achieve this reconciliation it is necessary to identify
triggering conditions beyond those focused on the interstate and intrastate
conflict paradigm. Identification of such criteria is particularly essential for
determining the existence of an extraterritorial noninternational armed conflict.
As one of the Authors has proposed elsewhere, such conflicts involve the
transnational characteristics of international armed conflict, but the military
operational characteristics of noninternational armed conflicts (because of the
state versus nonstate nature of the operations).8 2 As a result, attempting to rely
on the accepted triggering criteria for either of these categories of armed conflict
is like trying to put the proverbial square peg into the round hole. It is therefore
unsurprising that designating the struggle against international terrorism a
"global war" and announcing that the United States was engaged in an "armed
conflict" with al Qaeda was both controversial and ultimately confusing for the
armed forces required to execute operations associated with this struggle.
80. In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, a plurality of the Court embraced the conclusion
reached by Judge Williams in the D.C. Circuit, arguing that Common Article 3 operated in
"contradistinction" to Common Article 2, and applied to any armed conflict not satisfying Common
Article 2. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629-31. The dissenters rejected this interpretation, asserting that the
plain language of Common Article 3 did not extend to transnational conflicts against nonstate entities.
Id. at 718-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The President's interpretation of Common Article 3 is
reasonable and should be sustained. The conflict with al Qaeda is international in character in the
sense that it is occurring in various nations around the globe. Thus, it is also 'occurring in the territory
of' more than 'one of the High Contracting Parties."').
81. Corn, supra note 3, at 310.
82. Id. at 300-10.
[Vol. 81
UNTYING THE GORDIAN KNOT
Identification of law-triggering criteria that address such transnational
combat operations is not inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the
"either/or" paradigm. It is the underlying purpose reflected by the articles that
spawned this paradigm that should be the focus of law development. That
purpose was to provide a law-triggering mechanism that is based not on a legally
formalistic interpretation of treaty provisions but instead on the historically
validated necessity of providing regulation of warfare and limiting the suffering
associated with military conflict. Analyzing the law from this perspective leads to
the conclusion that it may have been simply an accident of history that resulted
in the failure to provide for regulation of transnational nonstate conflicts, caused
by the simple reality that the drafters of the Conventions did not have
contemporary experience with such conflicts. Accepting such a proposition-a
proposition bolstered by the policies adopted by professional armed forces
mandating application of the law during all military operations even when they
failed to fall under the Article 2 and 3 paradigm-leads to the necessity of
identifying an effective triggering criteria that can reconcile the reality of
contemporary combat operations with the internationally ordained application
trigger for the laws of war. As will be discussed below, analysis of rules of
engagement may provide the key for achieving such a reconciliation.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND How THEY
COMPLEMENT THE LAWS OF WAR
As demonstrated above, the development of warfare has been paralleled by
the formation of rules of warfare. Because those rules have responded to the
changes in the nature of warfare, over time they have not only been codified in
numerous treaties, but also generally accepted as authoritative by armed forces,
even when they are not meticulously applied in practice.8 3 Regardless of the
increasing influence on humanitarian organizations in the development and
interpretation of this law, the underlying tactical rationale for most of these rules
continues to be the military commander's desire to regulate the use of force by
warriors in order to facilitate accomplishment of political, tactical, or strategic
goals.
This idea of a commander controlling the use of force has resulted not only
in laws of war, but also in tactical control measures commonly referred to as
rules of engagement ("ROE"). As defined in U.S. military doctrine, ROE are
"[d]irectives issied by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. '"84 In other
words, ROE are intended to give operational and tactical military leaders
greater control over the execution of combat operations by subordinate forces.
Though not historically designated in contemporary terms, the history of warfare
83. See infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of the rules
of engagement.
84. DoD DICTIONARY, supra note 14. at 476.
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is replete with examples of what have essentially been ROE. From the leader of
the hunt by prehistoric man, who organized his forces to surround the great
mammoth, to the children of Israel marching around Jericho and blowing their
horns,8 5 as long as man has engaged in organized combat, military leaders have
used ROE as a mechanism to maximize success. The Battle of Bunker Hill
provides a more modern and perhaps quintessential example of such use.
Captain William Prescott imposed a limitation on the use of combat power by his
forces in the form of the directive "[d]on't one of you fire until you see the
whites of their eyes"8 6 in order to accomplish a tactical objective. Given his
limited resources against a much larger and better-equipped foe, he used this
tactical control measure to maximize the effect of his firepower. This example of
what was in effect ROE is remembered to this day for one primary reason-it
enabled the American rebels to maximize enemy casualties.
Another modern example of tactical controls on the use of force is the
Battle of Naco in 1914. The actual battle was between two Mexican factions, but
it occurred on the border with the United States.87 In response to the threat of
cross-border incursions, the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments, stationed at Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, were deployed to the U.S. side of the border to ensure that
U.S. neutrality was strictly maintained. 88 As part of the Cavalry mission, "[tihe
men were under orders not to return fire,"8 9 despite the fact that the U.S. forces
were routinely fired upon and "[t]he provocation to return the fire was very
great."90 Because of the soldiers' tactical restraint and correct application of their
orders-what today would be characterized as rules of engagement-the
strategic objective of maintaining U.S. neutrality was accomplished without
provoking a conflict between the Mexican factions and the United States.91 The
level of discipline reflected by the actions of these U.S. forces elicited a special
letter of commendation from the President and the Chief of Staff of the Army.92
Despite these and numerous other historical examples of soldiers applying
ROE, the actual term "rules of engagement" was not used in the United States
until 1958, when the military's Joint Chiefs of Staff ("JCS") first referred to it.93
85. Joshua 6:1-20.
86. Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering,
143 MIL. L. REV. 3, 34 (1994) (quoting JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 446 & n.1 (Emily
Morison Beck ed., 14th ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1968) (1855)).
87. See James P. Finley, Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: The Battle of Naco, HUACHUCA
ILLUSTRATED, 1993, available at http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/huachuca/Hll-10.htm
(providing information on Fall of Naco).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Colonel William C. Brown).
91. Id.
92. The commendation letter stated, "These troops were constantly under fire and one was killed
and 18 were wounded without a single case of return fire of retaliation. This is the hardest kind of
service and only troops in the highest state of discipline would stand such a test." Finley, supra note 87.
93. See generally Richard J. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge
Advocate's Primer, 42 A.F. L. REv. 245, 245-47 (1997) (indicating Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible
for Rules of Engagement enactment).
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As the Cold War began to heat up and the United States had military forces
spread across the globe, military leaders were anxious to control the application
of force and ensure it complied with national strategic policies. 94 With U.S. and
Soviet bloc forces looking at each other across fences and walls in Europe and
over small areas of air and water in the skies and oceans, it was important to
prevent a local commander's overreaction to a situation that began as a minor
insult or a probe to result in the outbreak of a conflict that could quickly escalate
into World War III. Accordingly, in 1981 the JCS produced a document titled
the JCS Peacetime ROE for Seaborne Forces, which subsequently expanded in
1988 into the JCS Peacetime ROE for all U.S. Forces.95 Then, at the end of the
Cold War, the JCS reconsidered their peacetime ROE and determined that the
document should be amended to apply to all situations, including war and
military operations other than war.96 In 1994, they promulgated the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement, which was subsequently
updated in 2000 and again in 2005. 97 As will be discussed below in detail, it is this
2005 edition that governs the actions of U.S. military members today.
ROE have become a key issue in modern warfare 98 and a key component of
mission planning for U.S. and many other armed forces.99 In preparation for
military operations, the President or Secretary of Defense personally reviews
and approves the ROE, ensuring they meet the military and political
objectives. 1° Ideally, ROE represent the confluence of three important factors:
94. See generally Robert K. Fricke, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, 160 MIL. L. REV. 248, 252-53 (1999) (book
review) (identifying Cuban missile crisis as event encouraging planning for "graduated use of force").
95. See Martins, supra note 86, at 22-26 (explaining rules with which military units must comply
under JCS Peacetime ROE, including United Nations Charter and international law regulations
regarding force).
96. Faculty, Judge Advocate General's School, International Law Notes: "Land Forces" Rules of
Engagement Symposium: The CLAMO Revises the Peacetime Rules of Engagement, ARMY LAW., Dec.
1993, at 48, 49.
97. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES FOR THE
USE OF FORCE FOR US FORCES (2005) [hereinafter CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
INSTRUCTION, No. CJCS1 3121.01B]; OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 84.
98. See Sean Mic.Cor.mack, Spokesman; U.S. Dep't of State, United States Department of State
Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 3, 2007), available at http:i/2001 -
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/oct93190.htm (explaining that civilians and contractors must abide by
rules of engagement in war zones).
99. See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK
FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 1-1 to 1-32 (2000) [hereinafter RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK]
(providing in-depth analysis on role rules of engagement play in planning process); OPERATIONAL
LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 84 (detailing potential parameters that rules of engagement
impose on mission planning).
100. See Dale Stephens, Rules of Engagement and the Concept of Unit Self Defense, 45 NAVAL L.
REV. 126, 126 (1998) (explaining that "national command authority" ensures rules of engagement are
in line with nation's military and political goals).
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operational requirements, national policy, and the law of war.101 This is
illustrated by the diagram below.
It is particularly important to note while ROE are not coterminus with the
laws of war, they must be completely consistent with the laws of war. In other
words, while there are laws of war that do not affect a mission's ROE, all ROE
must comply with the laws of war. This is illustrated by the diagram above, which
reflects the common situation where the authority provided by the ROE is more
limited than would be consistent with the laws of war. For example, in order to
provide greater protection against collateral injury to civilians, the ROE may
require that the engagement of a clearly defined military objective in a
populated area is authorized only when the target is under direct observation.
This is a fundamental principle and key to the proper formation and application
of ROE. In fact, the preeminent U.S. ROE order (discussed in Part V below)
explicitly directs U.S. forces that they "will comply with the Law of Armed
Conflict during military operations involving armed conflict, no matter how the
conflict may be characterized under international law, and will comply with the
principles and spirit of the Law of Armed Conflict during all other
operations. ' '102 Note that this directive applies to "armed conflict," not
international armed conflict. The significance of this language will be discussed
below.
101. Grunawalt, supra note 93, at 247.
102. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note
97, at A-1 para. 1(d).
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To illustrate this interaction between ROE and the laws of War, consider an
ROE provision that allows a soldier to kill an enemy. While this provision is
completely appropriate, it does not give the soldier the authority to kill an
enemy who is surrendering because such conduct would violate the law of war.10 3
Similarly, if the ROE allow a pilot to destroy a bridge with a bomb, that does not
relieve the pilot of the responsibility to do a proportionality analysis and be
certain that any incidental civilians deaths or damage to civilian property is not
"excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage"' ,), to be
gained by the destruction of the bridge. ROE will also often contain provisions
that remind soldiers that they can only engage the enemy or other individuals
that engage in defined conduct endangering soldiers or others. In this way, ROE
ensures compliance with the laws of war by reinforcing the requirement to abide
by the laws of war.
To ensure that approved ROE are properly understood and applied during
armed conflict, they become an integral part of the training in preparation for
military operations. 10 5 Military trainers are tasked with incorporating vignettes
into training that reinforce the ROE and law of war. The training also highlights
specific issues important to the upcoming military operation. For example, as a
result of the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention,10 6 the United
States has agreed not to use riot control agents such as tear gas as a method of
warfare. 10 7 Therefore, using riot control agents against an enemy in international
armed conflict would be a violation of the law of war for U.S. soldiers. However,
using riot control agents is not proscribed in other military operations such as
peace support operations conducted in Haiti. 08 As the unit prepares for their
mission, an analysis is done of what law of war constraints will apply, based on
the type of conflict, and then the training centers can adapt their training to
appropriately incorporate the use or nonuse of riot control agents. In this way,
the ROE not only act as a guide to the use of force but also are a flexible and
responsive method of ensuring compliance with international legal obligations in
armed conflict, including differing obligations between international armed
conflict, transnational armed conflict, and internal armed conflict.
103. See Susan L. Turley, Note, Keeping the Peace: Do the Laws of War Apply?, 73 TEX. L. REV.
139. 142 (1994) (categorizing reciprocity in dealing with enemy as central to laws of war).
104. Additional Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 57.2(b).
105. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 90-91 (explaining how rules of
engagement may affect soldiers); RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 99, at 2-1 to 2-12
(detailing rules of engagement training principles and tactics). See generally Martins, supra note 86, at
24 (discussing peacetime training in rules of engagement).
106. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No.
103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, available at http://www.cwc.gov/cwc-treaty.html.
107. See id. art. 1 (setting forth obligations of parties, including agreement to refrain from use of
riot control agents in warfare).
108. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 99, at C-29.
2008]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
IV. Two BROAD CATEGORIES OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: STATUS RULES AND
CONDUCT RULES
As discussed above, for the United States, the seminal ROE directive is the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B Standing Rules of
Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces ("CJCSI"), 1°9 as
amended in 2005. The CJCSI is divided into two parts, the Standing Rules of
Engagement for U.S. Forces ("SROE") and Standing Rules for the Use of Force
("SRUF"). The CJCSI explains the purpose of the SRUF as follows:
The SRUF . . . establish fundamental policies and procedures
governing the actions to be taken by US commanders and their forces
during all DOD civil support . . . and routine Military Department
functions (including [antiterrorism/force protection] duties) occurring
within US territory or US territorial seas. SRUF also apply to land
homeland defense missions occurring within US territory and to DOD
forces, civilians and contractors performing law enforcement and
security duties at all DOD installations . . . within or outside US
territory, unless otherwise directed by the [Secretary of Defense]." 110
SRUF therefore are not particularly relevant to the thesis of this Article
because they are intended to apply in what are relatively clear
peacetime/nonconflict situations.
In contrast, and directly relevant to our thesis, the SROE "establish
fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by US
commanders and their forces during all military operations and contingencies
and routine Military Department functions."'11  This includes
"Antiterrorism/Force Protection... duties, but excludes law enforcement and
security duties on DoD installations, and off-installation while conducting
official DoD security functions, outside US territory and territorial seas." 112 The
SROE also apply to "air and maritime homeland defense missions conducted
within US territory or territorial seas, unless otherwise directed by the [Secretary
of Defense]" '113 and are standing instructions that are "in effect until
rescinded."'1 4 Thus, the SROE are standing instructions regulating the use of
destructive military power that apply to almost everything the military does
outside the continental United States. 115 Unless otherwise directed, it applies to
soldiers stationed in Germany, air crews providing disaster assistance in Pakistan
109. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note
97. The CJCSI is classified SECRET but the basic instruction and Enclosure A titled "Standing Rules
of Engagement for US Forces" are unclassified. Id. All references in this Article will come from the
basic instruction or the unclassified enclosure and will be from the 2005 edition unless otherwise
noted.
110. Id. at 1.
111. Id.
112. Id. at A-1 para. 1(a).
113. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, NO. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note
97, at A-1 para. 1(a).
114. Id. at A-1 para. 1(d).
115. See Grunawalt, supra note 93, at 247-48 (describing scope of SROE's application).
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after an earthquake, Marines on shore leave in Australia, and sailors cruising
through the Mediterranean. And they certainly apply to members of the military
patrolling neighborhoods on a United Nations peace enforcement mission or
fighting in the streets against a counterinsurgency.
A. Organization
Understanding the organization of the U.S. ROE Instruction provides
insight into the principles it espouses. The basic instruction is only six pages long,
unclassified, and provides only general guidelines concerning the use of force. 116
Most importantly, it discusses the general applicability of the document as
discussed above, and then highlights the difference between the rules for self-
defense and mission accomplishment which will be discussed in detail below.
Appended to the basic instruction are seventeen Enclosures, the majority of
which are protected by national security classification.' 17 The first enclosure,
however, is unclassified and deals with the self-defense policies under the
SROE.118 Enclosures B, C, and D contain general rules tailored for maritime,
air, and land operations, respectively. 19 Enclosures E through H contain more
specific rules targeted at types of military operations, rather than instructions
based on the geographic aspects of the operations.1 20 These later enclosures
include directions for space operations, information operations, noncombatant
operations, and counterdrug operations. 12' Enclosure I contains a menu of
potential supplemental measures which will be discussed below in Part IV.F.122
This is followed by Enclosure J, discussing the ROE request and authorization
process, and Enclosure K, containing a list of references. 123 Enclosures L through
Q deal with the SRUF and will therefore not be discussed. 2 4
B. Bifurcation
The genius of the SROE is in its bifurcation between the rules governing
self-defense and mission accomplishment. This foundational principle is the key
to proper understanding and application of force by U.S. forces. As the
116. See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra
note 97, at A-1 para. 1(a) (describing purpose and scope of SROE).
117. See, e.g., INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REVIEW OF MATrERS RELATED TO THE
AUGUST 28, 2005 SHOOTING OF REUTERS JOURNALISTS 43 n.22 (2008), available at
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/inspections/ipo/reporis/Rciiters%20Fina!%20Print%20Version.pdf
(discussing scope of unclassified materials).
118. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note
97, at 3, A-1.









document states, "The purpose of the SROE is to provide implementation
guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the
exercise of self-defense."' 25 Throughout the document these two situations are
treated as almost mutually exclusive. 126 By treating these two applications of
force separately, the instruction provides a paradigm where each set of rules can
be the subject of appropriate training to ensure they are clearly understood and
readily applicable. Accordingly, they facilitate the execution of missions
regardless of whether military members are employing force in self-defense or
employing force without the necessity of immediate imminent threat in order to
accomplish a designated operational mission.
This bifurcation of force employment authority between mission
accomplishment and traditional self-defense principles is indicative of both the
nature of the mission as well as the nature of anticipated threats posed by
different groups that might be encountered during such missions. For example,
when U.S. forces entered Iraq in March 2003, the Iraqi forces were presumably
the "enemy" and could be attacked on sight irrespective of whether they were
presenting U.S. forces with an imminent threat. Individuals in this category were
easy to identify because they were normally wearing Iraqi uniforms. The Iraqi
forces were also, of course, correspondingly able to engage U.S. forces on sight
without waiting for any specific action or additional direction. These
engagements were governed by the mission accomplishment ROE, which
provided robust authority to engage any Iraqi soldier upon contact. 127
In contrast, once U.S. forces defeated the Iraqi military and established
general control in areas throughout Iraq and began moving among the populace,
there was the additional risk that they would come under attack from time to
time by members of this population. Such risk did not come from Iraqi forces or
other lawful combatants under the definitions in the Geneva Conventions. 28
125. Id. at A-1 para. 1(a).
126. See id. at A-2 to A-3 (defining force and self-defense).
127. See Grunawalt, supra note 93, at 255 (explaining mission accomplishment ROE).
128. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 48, art. 4 (outlining requirements to be considered
prisoner of war). Prisoner of War status is reserved for lawful combatants:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of
the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority
not recognized by the Detaining Power.
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Instead, it came from Iraqi civilians who opposed the U.S. presence in Iraq. In
these situations, U.S. forces responded not against declared or known hostile
forces, but against an otherwise protected civilian who had decided to take up
arms and act hostile to US forces. In this situation, it is self-defense principles
that are implemented by the ROE, authorizing U.S. forces to employ necessary
force in response to an imminent threat directed to them or other innocent
individuals. Thus, when employing force against the Iraqi armed forces, it is their
status as members of that group that subjects them to attack, whereas when
employing force against hostile civilians, it is their conduct that subjects them to
attack.
Though the SROE treat mission accomplishment and self-defense as almost
mutually exclusive, there are situations where such bifurcation could be
misleading. For example, if U.S. forces engage an opponent who launches an
attack against them during combat or high intensity conflict situations, they are
ostensibly defending themselves. In such situations, should the response be
governed by the self-defense rules? The answer is no. Because they are in a
combat environment and declared hostile forces are engaging them, their use of
force is governed by mission accomplishment rules, even though the nature of
the response also implicates self-defense. This provides an operational advantage
for U.S. forces because, as explained below, mission accomplishment rules are
generally more permissive than self-defense rules. There are similar examples on
the fringes of the differentiation between self-defense and mission
accomplishment, 129 but for the majority of situations, this bifurcation is a great
aid not only in applying force but also in the conduct of preparatory training for
an assigned mission.
C. Status Versus Conduct
Within the SROE, there are several definitions that are key to the proper
application of force and that must be clear to guide an appropriate response in
situations similar to the Iraq hypothetical above. As described in that
hypothetical, in March 2003 the Iraqi army was the enemy, or "declared hostile
forces." Declared hostile forces are defined in the SROE as "[a]ny civilian,
paramilitary or military force or terrorist(s) that has been declared hostile by
appropriate US authority." 130 Under the SROE, U.S. forces may always engage
a declared hostile force, irrespective of their manifested conduct (with the
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form
themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws
and customs of war.
Id.
129. Grunawalt, supra note 93, at 255.
130. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note
97, at A-3 para. 3(d).
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exception of conduct that clearly indicates such personnel are hors de combat).1 31
It is their status as members of a declared hostile force that makes them subject
to attack. It does not matter whether the declared hostile force is sleeping, taking
a shower, eating a meal, or attacking U.S. forces. In all cases, they may be
attacked. 132 This is not to say that once identified as a member of a hostile group,
U.S. forces must attack. Ultimately, other tactical considerations will dictate the
nature of the U.S. reaction. For example, if a U.S. soldier happens upon a
sleeping Iraqi soldier, it may very well be tactically preferable to capture this
enemy rather than kill him. But this merely illustrates that the authority granted
by the ROE, which is in turn derived from the law of war principle of military
objective, is just that-an authority, and not an obligation. Understanding the
distinction between authority and obligation is therefore essential to appreciate
the significance of the tactical choice to forego an otherwise lawful attack. It is,
however, the authority provided by the ROE as the result of the designation of
"hostile force" that permits the U.S. soldier kill the "sleeping enemy" if such
action is deemed tactically appropriate.
This is in contrast to the civilian in the Iraq hypothetical who takes up arms
against U.S. forces. His status is that of a civilian, a protected status 33 that
prohibits U.S. forces making him the object of attack. However, when he
attacks, 34 he is divested of that protected status and military forces have the
right to respond in self-defense. 135 In other words, the protection he enjoys from
being made the object of attack is not absolute, but instead may be forfeited for
as long as the civilian engages in conduct that threatens U.S. forces. This is only
logical, for no state would consent to a law of war principle that would deprive
their personnel of the ability to act in self-defense and defense of others.
131. Id. at A-2 para. 2(b).
132. Id.
133. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 51.1 (providing that civilians are protected
from military attacks).
134. See id. art. 51.3 (stating that civilians are protected until they "take a direct part in
hostilities"). The definition of "direct participation in hostilities" is a matter of some controversy.
Academics and military leaders have searched for a workable definition since its inception. See, e.g., J.
Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces,
57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 176-80 (2005) (attempting to define scope of direct participation required). The
Commentary is not much help as almost all agree that it is broader than this definition. The ICRC has
an on-going "group of experts" meeting to discuss this topic. With such a lack of clarity, it is beyond
the scope of this Article to resolve that issue. However, it is important here to draw the distinction
between "direct participation in hostilities" as a law of war principle and self-defense ROE principles.
ROE and the law of war are not coterminus, but ROE must comply with the law of war. See supra
notes 100-01 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements of ROE. Therefore, when a
civilian takes a direct part in hostilities by attacking a member of the military, he surrenders his law of
war protective status and becomes targetable. Additional Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 51.3. The ROE
then govern the tactical application of force against that targetable civilian. See supra notes Part IV.D
for a discussion of when the ROE permit use of force in self-defense.
135. See supra note 134 for a discussion of targetable civilians.
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D. Self-Defense
When responding in self-defense, two SROE definitions are determinative:
hostile act, and hostile intent.136 The SROE define a hostile act as "[a]n attack or
other use of force against the United States, US forces or other designated
persons or property. It also includes force used directly to preclude or impede
the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel
or vital USG property. '1 37 This is the easier of the two principles to understand
and apply. In the Iraq hypothetical, it is when the civilian shoots at U.S. forces.
By attacking U.S. forces, he has committed a hostile act to which U.S. forces may
respond with proportionate force, 138 including deadly force if necessary.
Hostile intent is "[t]he threat of imminent use of force against the United
States, US forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes the
threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces,
including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property."'139 Determining a
"threat" or "imminent use of force" necessarily injects increased subjectivity into
the analysis. Application of this principle is dictated by the actions prior to firing
at U.S. forces, such as when the prospective attacker establishes a firing position,
raises his rifle or puts the U.S. forces in his weapon sight. Once the prospective
attacker's intent is discernible and his capability evident, U.S. forces may
respond with proportionate force, including deadly force. 140
The need for military members to be able to respond to hostile act and
hostile intent is amply illustrated from unfortunate past experience. In 1982, the
U.S. military units deployed to Beirut as part of a multinational force comprised
of British, French, and Italian forces. 141 Their mission was to facilitate the
withdrawal of non-Lebanese forces from the country. 142 There was no "enemy"
136. But see Stephens, supra note 99, at 142 (arguing that definitions of hostile act and hostile
intent are overly broad to comply with international law).
137. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note
97, at A-3 para. 3(e).
138. The SROE uses the term "proportionality" instead of proportionate force. Id. at A-3 para.
4(a)(3). However, to avoid confusion with the law of war term "proportionality," this Article uses the
term "proportionate force." In describing a proportionate response, the SROE state
[t]he use of force in self-defense should be sufficient to respond decisively to hostile acts or
demonstrations of hostile intent. Such use of force may exceed the means and intensity of
the hostile act or hostile intent, but the nature, duration and scope of force used should not
exceed what is required.
Id.
139. Id. at A-3 para. 3(f). "The determination of whether the use of force against US forces is
imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to US forces at the time
and may be made at any level. Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous." Id.
at A-3 para. 3(g).
140. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note
97, at A-3 para. 4(a)(3).
141. For an excellent analysis of the events in Beirut, see Martins, supra note 86, at 10-12.
142. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE DOD COMMISSION ON BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL




or declared hostile force. 143 As the mission continued into 1983, relations
between the local population and the multinational forces deteriorated. 144 On
October 23, 1983, a suicide bomber drove a truck loaded with explosives that
were the equivalent of over 12,000 tons of TNT past several guard stations and
crashed into the Marine barracks, detonating the explosives and killing 241
Marines. 145
As a result of the attack, the Secretary of Defense convened a commission
to "examine the rules of engagement in force and the security measures in place
at the time of the attack. ' 146 While the commission concluded that the "ROE
used by the Embassy security detail were designed to counter the terrorist threat
posed by both vehicles and personnel," it also concluded that "Marines on
similar duty at [Beirut International Airport], however, did not have the same
ROE to provide them specific guidance and authority to respond to a vehicle or
person moving through a perimeter. ' 147 One of the contributing factors on which
the commission based its conclusion was that the ROE "underscored the need to
fire only if fired upon, to avoid harming innocent civilians, to respect civilian
property, and to share security and self-defense efforts with the [Lebanese
Armed Forces]."'1 48 Had the Marines been functioning under the hostile intent
and hostile act rules that U.S. service members currently function under, their
permissible actions in self-defense would have been clear and a tragedy
potentially averted.
It is therefore apparent that the engagement authorization provided by the
self-defense prong of the ROE essentially extends traditional criminal self-
defense and defense of others principles to the operational environment. 149
Hostile intent and hostile act serve as triggers for proportionate actions in self-
defense or defense of others. This is a true necessity-based authority, permitting
only that amount of responsive force necessary to terminate the threat, and
extant for only so long as the threat exists. 150 Because of the necessity basis for
this authority, the SROE permit the use of force pursuant to this prong of
authority at all times and during all missions.151 This authority never changes in
143. Id.
144. Id. at 39-40.
145. Id. at 1-2; Stephens, supra note 99, at 128.
146. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMISSION, BEIRUT REPORT, supra note 142, at 19.
147. Id. at 50.
148. Id. at 51.
149. See David Bolgiano et al., Defining the Right of Self-Defense: Working Toward the Use of a
Deadly Force Appendix to the Standing Rules of Engagement for the Department of Defense, 31 U.
BALT. L. REv. 157, 166 (2002) (describing "inherent right" to self-defense as essential element of
American common law).
150. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note
97, at A-3.
151. There has been some discussion amongst military personnel about the "inherent right of
self-defense" and allegations that the principles of self-defense are insufficient to protect individual
soldiers. See, e.g., Bolgiano, supra note 149, at 160 (arguing that self-defense principles in SROE are
"confusing, confounding, and dangerous"). This right of self-defense is vested in the commander of the
unit rather than individual members of the unit. As the SROE states,
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relation to the nature of the operational mission and even applies when
functioning under operational ROE different than those in the SROE, such as
when U.S. forces operate under the command and control of a multinational
force such as NATO. 152
The indelible nature of this self-defense prong of the ROE add immensely
to their military value by making them a prime training tool. As U.S. forces train
day-to-day for undetermined future missions with undetermined mission
accomplishment ROE, they can always base such training on the default
expectation that these self-defense principles will apply in whatever mission they
are assigned. 53 In current operations in Iraq, some have raised allegations that
the military is not permitted adequate ROE to defend themselves. 5 4 This is not
true. While many of the same considerations apply in Iraq as applied in Beirut,
there should be no doubt in the minds of military members as to their ability to
respond in self-defense with proportionate force. These principles are not only
taught and trained constantly through standard military training requirement,
but are also reinforced on a continuing basis while in Iraq. Having these self-
defense principles remain constant and unchanging allows them to become as
natural and immediate to a member of the armed forces as clearing a jammed
weapon or reloading ammunition in the middle of a firefight.
155
E. Mission Accomplishment
While the ROE principles for self-defense are constant, each mission will
likely have its own specific ROE that provide authorizations to use force to
accomplish the designated operational mission. If the military mission is to
Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-
defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless otherwise directed
by a unit commander as detailed below, military members may exercise individual self-
defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When individuals are
assigned and acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense should be considered a subset of
unit self-defense. As such, unit commanders may limit individual self-defense by members of
their unit. Both unit and individual self-defense includes defense of other US military forces
in the vicinity.
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 97, at A-2
para. 3(a) (emphasis added).
152. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note
97, at A-1 para. 1(f).
153. Because self-defense ROE focus on the conduct of civilians and other noncombatants, the
validity of this assumption is based on the reality that there will always be civilians of some kind in the
area. Even in the hottest of combat battles, it is seldom that all civilians have been completely swept
from the battle area. And if recent conflicts are a pattern of things to come, it is likely that hostilities
will continue to be conducted among the civilian population, making a clear understanding of these
rules and a pattern of consistent practice and training on conduct-based actions a vital part of military
preparation. These conduct-based rules will allow soldiers to respond appropriately on the modern
battlefield and still preserve the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants.
154. Kyndra Rotunda, Denying Self-Defense to GIs in Iraq, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Mar. 2,
2007, at 9.
155. See Martins, supra note 86, at 6 (noting that once shots are fired, soldiers will follow rules
that through repetition and experience have become second nature).
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destroy, defeat, or neutralize a designated enemy force or organization, such as
the Iraqi Army in 2003, personnel associated with that force will be declared
hostile pursuant to the ROE. The consequence of this designation is that once
individuals are identified as a member of such a group or organization-a
designation based on relevant criteria established through the intelligence
preparation process-U.S. forces have the authority (but as noted above not
necessarily the obligation) to immediately attack these "targets. 1' 56 Thus, it is
the "status" of being associated with the declared hostile organization that
triggers the use-of-force authority: threat identification results in a group of
individuals that as a result of their status, i.e., membership of a specific
organization such as an army, may be attacked.157 As the SROE state, "[o]nce a
force is declared hostile by appropriate authority, US forces need not observe a
hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent before engaging the declared hostile
force."158
Although specifics of potential mission accomplishment rules are protected
from public disclosure as classified information, as a general rule they fall into
two categories: (1) Measures that "specify certain actions that require [Secretary
of Defense] approval," and (2) Measures that "allow commanders to place limits
on the use of force during the conduct of certain actions. '15 9 One of the most
important aspects of these two prongs of authority is that unless a specific action
falls within those measures requiring approval by the Secretary of Defense, the
operational commander may assume he has the authority to use all lawful means
and measures without having to seek additional authorization. This means that
as military commanders face difficult situations in Iraq and other areas, they
should plan to employ their entire arsenal of capabilities, limited only by the law
of war and their judgment as to what is operationally and tactically appropriate.
Underlying all of these measures for mission accomplishment is the
assumption that mission accomplishment may require more specific use-of-force
authorization than that provided by the self-defense prong of the SROE. When
authorizing such additional measures, the authorizing commander is able to
provide additional guidance on the application of force against individuals or
groups based on their status. Because these measures are not constant and
change for each mission (and often change during missions) they are precisely
tailored for each mission, providing clear directives for the use of force related to
specific operations. 16° This in turn assists the forces tasked to execute such
156. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note
97, at A-2 to A-3.
157. Id.
158. Id. at A-2 para. 2(b). The necessity of this rule is obvious. Determining hostile act or hostile
intent is a difficult task and requires constant watchfulness. Such action is not required when facing a
declared enemy who is equally free to attack U.S. forces and is willing to demonstrate that by wearing
a uniform and carrying their arms openly.
159. Id. at 2 para. 6(b)(2)(a)(1), (2).
160. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 84-85 (detailing purpose of mission-
specific directives). See generally RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 99, at 1-1 to 1-32
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missions by providing direction on whether they may employ unrestricted use of
force or must instead comply with limits on that use of force designed to enhance
the probability of mission accomplishment.
In an effort to highlight the utility of the ROE regime, consider the
following scenario, adapted from the 1991 Gulf War. In 1990, Iraq invaded
Kuwait.16' As a result of the invasion, the United States engaged in a political
process with the United Nations, the result of which was a political decision to
expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait and reestablish the international border. As a
result of this political decision, the U.S. military became involved in a military
operation to invade Kuwait, expel Iraqi forces, and restore the international
border. Assume for analytical purposes that a group of indigenous Kuwaitis,
known as the KLI, supported Iraq during the invasion and continue to be active
in Kuwait but have not taken up arms. As U.S. forces prepare to deploy, the
President and Secretary of Defense issue ROE that declare Iraqi forces as
hostile forces. Based on this ROE, when U.S. forces arrive in Kuwait, they can
immediately attack all Iraqi forces as a "status-based" declared hostile force.
They can also respond with proportionate force in self-defense to other
individuals or groups that commit hostile acts or demonstrate hostile intent.
Assume further that the conflict continues, and the U.S. forces successfully
begin expelling Iraqi forces across the border. In order to support Iraqi forces,
the KLI organizes into a militia that begins attacking U.S. forces. While U.S.
forces can respond with proportionate force to all hostile attacks and hostile
intent, they can only respond based on the KLI's conduct. The commander of
U.S. forces determines that the KLI are now organized and represent a threat to
U.S. forces so he requests that the KLI militia be declared as a hostile force so
they can be attacked without having to wait for some hostile conduct by KLI
militia members. The response approves the ROE change and the commander
disseminates that change, ensuring that every sailor, soldier, airman, and Marine
understands the new ROE measure.
As the operation continues, at some point the U.S. destroys the
effectiveness of the KLI militia and repels the Iraqi forces back into Iraq. The
U.S. and U.N. broker an armistice and both Kuwait and Iraq agree to its terms.
As part of the agreement, the United States is asked to act as an implementation
force and monitor the agreement and patrol the border between the two nations.
In response to the new operation, the President and Secretary of Defense modify
the existing ROE. While the self-defense rules remain unchanged, both the KLI
and Iraqi forces would no longer be declared hostile forces and the ROE would
be changed to remove U.S. forces' authority to attack them based on their status.
However, if they commit hostile acts or demonstrate hostile intent, U.S. forces
(describing process of ROE development and noting need for adequate planning and integration of
development through all phases of mission).
161. See generally Majid Khadduri, Perspectives on the Gulf War, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 847, 848
(1994) (reviewing JOHN NORTON MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW (1992)
and LAWRENCE FREEDMAN & EFRAIM KARSH, THE GULF CONFLICT, 1990-1991: DIPLOMACY AND
WAR IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1993)).
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could still respond in self-defense with proportionate force, including deadly
force if necessary.
This example highlights the flexibility of the ROE to respond to mission
requirements. It also demonstrates the value of the unchanging "conduct-based"
ROE that allow the military to respond to hostile acts and hostile intent
regardless of the current mission. At no point in the mission did the self-defense
ROE change. Military members who had been trained to respond appropriately
to hostile acts and hostile intent continued to apply that training as the fluid
nature of the mission changed. In contrast, the fluid nature of the mission
changed the political and strategic goals of the United States. The "status-based"
ROE were able to change accordingly, ensuring that the appropriate amount of
force was applied against the appropriate targets. The ROE were also responsive
to military changes on the ground, such as the militarization of the KLI, changing
the response to their actions from a "conduct-based" ROE to a "status-based"
ROE and then back again when "status-based" ROE were no longer needed or
appropriate.
This distinction between conduct- and status-based justifications for the use
of force is fundamental to the U.S. theory on the conduct of military operations.
It is key to a proper understanding and application of the SROE. It is not only a
commander's tool to control his forces, but also a tool to limit and authorize
specific methods of warfare necessary to meet the political and strategic ends of
a particular operation, while always providing for the self-defense of military
personnel, regardless of the nature of the mission.
V. OPERATIONAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: THE ULTIMATE DE FACTO
INDICATOR OF ARMED CONFLICT
As explained above, ROE fall into two broad categories of use-of-force
authorization: conduct-based and status-based. It is this dichotomy that provides
a truly de facto indication of the existence of armed conflict for purposes of
triggering fundamental principles of the laws of war. 162 Because conduct-based
ROE are inherently self-defensive and responsive in nature, they indicate that
the state views the nature of the military mission as insufficient to trigger the
targeting authority of the laws of war. However, because status-based ROE
require no justification for the use of force beyond threat recognition and
identification, they indicate that the state views the nature of the military mission
as sufficient to trigger the targeting authority of the laws of war. In such
situations, it is the principle of military objective that dictates the application of
combat power once the threat identification process results in the conclusion that
the object of anticipated attack is a member of a designated hostile group. 63
Because the approval of status-based ROE implicitly invokes the target
engagement authority of the laws of war, it seems logical that such issuance
162. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of ROE categorization.
163. See supra Part IV.C for an analysis of the distinction between conduct- and status-based
categories.
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should trigger an analogous requirement to comply with fundamental regulatory
obligations derived from the laws of war. And because such ROE have and will
likely continue to be issued for military operations that fall into the twilight zone
between Common Articles 2 and 3, this indication that the state is invoking the
laws of war in support of mission accomplishment provides the missing
ingredient in determining when these principles apply outside this established
law-triggering paradigm. Clinging to the restrictions of this paradigm in such
situations produces a dangerous de facto anomaly: military forces will execute
operations with the force and effect of expansive authority without being
constrained, as a matter of law, by any balancing principles. Such an anomaly
may be explicable in purely treaty interpretation terms, but it is inconsistent with
the historical underpinnings of the laws of war noted above. To this end, it is
important to understand why the focus on a consideration not already identified
by the Geneva Conventions or their associated commentaries is necessary.
As noted above, the most significant concern related to the decision to
interject international legal regulation into the realm of noninternational armed
conflicts was the intrusion of state sovereignty represented by Common Article
3.164 Although today such intrusions are relatively unremarkable as the result of
the rapid evolution of human rights law in the latter half of the twentieth
century, 165 in 1949 subjecting a purely internal conflict to international regulation
was indeed remarkable 66 Considering that such conflicts often challenged the
existence of the state itself, what is regarded today as a relatively modest level of
regulation was profound, for it vested internal enemies of the state with a shield
of international protection.
Because of sovereignty concerns, the drafters of Common Article 3 walked
a proverbial tightrope between mandating humanitarian protections for victims
of internal armed conflicts and protecting states from unwarranted application of
international law to internal affairs. 167 Although the language of Common
164. See generally Corn, supra note 3, at 300-10 (noting changes in nature of warfare and
observing that limitations of Common Articles 2 and 3 result in uncertainty with regard to whether
conflict is international or noninternational).
165. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 701
(2008) (discussing universally accepted intrusion of international human rights norms in realm of state
sovereignty). See generally Kenneth Watkin, supra note 75 (discussing potential role of human rights
norms in regulation of armed conflict).
166. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 21-23 (2002) (noting stiff
state resistance to "international regulation of internal armed conflict").
167. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 60, at 32-35. The Commentary emphasizes that the limited
scope of applicability of Common Article 3 was responsive to historical concerns related to the
protection of state sovereignty:
It at least ensures the application of the rules of humanity which are recognized as essential
by civilized nations and provides a legal basis for interventions by the International
Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization-
interventions which in the past were all too often refused on the ground that they




Article 3 refers only to "conflict[s] not of an international character,"' 68 the
ICRC Commentary emphasized the necessity of distinguishing internal
disturbances not rising to the level of armed conflict from those situations
triggering application of the substantive protections of the article. 69 This seems
somewhat axiomatic, for all it really emphasized was that the law of war should
apply only to armed conflicts. 170 However, it was the analytical method proposed
by the Commentary that provided insight into how focusing on de facto criteria
should dictate interpretation of the armed conflict trigger.
In order to protect the sovereignty of party states, the Commentary
indicates that the key focus of the treaty drafters was determining the existence
of an actual armed conflict.171 To this end, the Commentary offered a number of
objective criteria that either individually or in combination would indicate an
internal situation had crossed the threshold from nonconflict to armed
conflict. 172 These included, among others, the scope, intensity, and duration of
military operations; whether the dissident group controlled territory to the
exclusion of government forces; and whether the dissident group enjoyed
demonstrable popular support. 173  However, because none of these
considerations would be dispositive of the existence of armed conflict, the
Commentary proposed an additional consideration: the nature of the
government response to the threat.174 According to the Commentary, one
important indication of the existence of armed conflict is when a government is
forced to resort to regular armed forces to respond to a dissident threat. 75 Use
of such forces is normally reserved for combat-type operations. Accordingly,
employment of such forces would indicate that the state authorities no longer
considered normal law enforcement assets capable of responding to the dissident
threat, which in turn would indicate that the threat had progressed beyond
widespread criminal activity or civil disobedience.
In the realm of internal armed conflicts, this "nature of government
response" consideration is indeed extremely indicative of the existence of armed
conflict. 176 Of course, this one factor has not been a talisman. In some situations,
the commingling of military and law enforcement organizations make it difficult
to apply this factor; in others, precipitous resort to military forces to respond to
civil disturbances undermines the efficacy of this factor. 177 However, once a state
168. Geneva Convention I, supra note 48, art. 3.
169. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 60, at 35-37.
170. Id. at 22-23.
171. Id. at 35-36.
172. Id. at 35-37.
173. Id.
174. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 60, at 36.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 35-37.
177. For example, the federal police forces of some states are technically a component of the
armed forces. This was the case in Panama when the United States executed Operation Just Cause to
oust General Noriega. See History Office, XVIII Airborne Corps and Joint Task Force South,
Panamanian Defense Force Order of Battle: Operation Just Cause, http://www.history.army.mil/
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employs its armed forces to conduct combat operations against an internal
dissident threat, it becomes almost impossible to disavow the existence of armed
conflict.
Unfortunately, in the emerging realm of transnational military operations
between state and nonstate forces, this factor is far less instructive in determining
the existence of armed conflict. There are two reasons for this. First, in the
context of responding to an internal dissident threat-the context for which this
factor was originally proposed-use of the regular armed forces is generally
regarded as a somewhat extraordinary escalation from the norm of police
response. 178 However, such contextual significance is less profound in relation to
transnational operations, for the simple reason that it would be equally
extraordinary for a state to use its own nonmilitary (law enforcement) security
forces outside its borders.
The second reason, one that exacerbates the significance of the contextual
difference between internal armed conflict and transnational armed conflict, is
that states routinely use military forces to conduct nonconflict "peace
operations. '" 179 Military forces conducting such operations almost always operate
under a legal mandate limiting their authority to use combat power to situations
of self-defense or defense of others; rarely does such authority allow the
application of combat power as a measure of first resort. Because of this, such
operations almost never rise to a level of hostility considered sufficient to trigger
application of the law of war. This was emphasized in the recently revised U.K.
Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict:
documents/panama/pdfob.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2009) (listing "Fuerza de Policia" as component of
armed forces). Even in states where the police are not a component of the armed forces, the armed
forces may be called upon to provide assistance to police forces for the purposes of law enforcement,
as occurred when the U.S. Army provided assistance to federal law enforcement efforts to arrest
David Koresh in Waco. See Philip Shenon, Documents on Waco Point to a Close Commando Role,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, at A14 (indicating involvement of armed forces in assisting law enforcement
agencies may have been longer and closer than previously thought).
178. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 216 (2d ed. 2004) (arguing that continued
state control and application of domestic law can be indicative of internal security problem while lack
of state control or normal application of domestic law can be indicative of armed conflict).
179. See generally OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 52-57 (discussing
definition, key concepts, legal authority, and U.S. role in peace operations). The Handbook
summarizes Peace Operations as follows (drawing from other Department of Defense doctrinal
sources):
1. Peace Operations is a new and comprehensive term that covers a wide range of activities.
FM 3-07 defines peace operations as: "military operations to support diplomatic efforts to
reach a long-term political settlement and categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO)
and peace enforcement operations (PEO)."
2. Whereas peace operations are authorized under both Chapters VI and VII of the United
Nations Charter, the doctrinal definition excludes high end enforcement actions where the
UN or UN sanctioned forces have become engaged as combatants and a military solution
has now become the measure of success. An example of such is Operation Desert Storm.
While authorized under Chapter VII, this was international armed conflict and the
traditional laws of war applied.
Id. at 53 (footnotes omitted).
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The extent to which [Peace Support Operations, or PSO] forces are
subject to the law of armed conflict depends upon whether they are
party to an armed conflict with the armed forces of a state or an entity
which, for these purposes, is treated as a state ....
Where PSO forces become party to an armed conflict with such
forces, then both sides are required to observe the law of armed
conflict in its entirety ....
[A] PSO force which does not itself take an active part in
hostilities does not become subject to the law of armed conflict simply
because it is operating in territory in which an armed conflict is taking
place between other parties. That will be the case, for example, where
a force with a mandate to observe a cease-fire finds that the cease-fire
breaks down and there is a recurrence of fighting between the parties
in which the PSO force takes no direct part.
It is not always easy to determine whether a PSO force has become
a party to an armed conflict or to fix the precise moment at which that
event has occurred. Legal advice and guidance from higher military
and political levels should be sought if it appears possible that the
threshold of armed conflict has been, or is about to be, crossed. 80
Because the use-of-force authority normally associated with these
transnational "peace operations" is inherently defensive in nature, 181 it is
essential to focus on some alternate analytical factor to distinguish between
nonconflict transnational military operations and those that trigger the laws of
war. And, because this type of armed conflict was either unanticipated or
overlooked by the drafters of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, neither the text of
these treaties nor the ICRC Commentary provide such a factor. But this does
not mean that none could be identified. Combining consideration of the
underlying purpose of the Convention triggers with the realities of contemporary
military operations leads almost inexorably to one conclusion: status-based ROE
provide this elusive factor.
In order to emphasize the validity of this proposition, it is useful to consider
the nature of the contemporary debate on the applicability of the laws of war to
the war on terror. It is not uncommon for the question of law of war applicability
to be hotly debated during contemporary symposia addressing issues related to
the Global War on Terror. 182 Participants in such debates often argue that the
war on terror is not really a "war," and as a result the laws of war do not regulate
180. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 70, at 11 14.3-14.4, 14.6-14.7 (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
181. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 100-23, PEACE OPERATIONS 34-35 (1994)
(indicating that during peacekeeping operations, use of force should be last resort but rules of
engagement should not hinder commander's duty to protect his troops).
182. See generally Daphnd Richemond, Transnational Terrorist Organizations and the Use of
Force, 56 CAT. U. L. REv. 1001, 1001 (2007) (analyzing rules governing warfare in light of war on
terror and transnational terrorist organizations). This article appeared as part of Catholic University
Law Review's Symposium on Reexamining the Law of War.
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it. The paradigm of Common Articles 2 and 3 is then cited in support of such
arguments. 183
What is striking about such debates is how they seem to ignore the
pragmatic realities of military operations. Such realities are the day-to-day
business of the armed forces tasked to execute operations under the Global War
on Terror rubric. These forces have been and will continue to be called upon to
execute military operations to destroy or disable terrorist personnel and assets.
Unlike politicians, policymakers, scholars, and pundits, they do not have the
luxury of debating the legal niceties of whether the law of war should or should
not apply to their operations. For them, the line between armed conflict and
nonconflict operations is easily defined: when they are authorized to engage
opponents based solely on status identification-opponents who ostensibly seek
to kill them-they know they are engaged in armed conflict.
It is this simple reality that illustrates the value of ROE as a factor to
determine when the laws of war are triggered by transnational military
operations, for it is the ROE that informs the soldier of the nature of the
operation. As noted elsewhere in this Article, ROE provide a clear indication of
how the state ordering the military operation perceives both the threat and the
authority to address the threat.184 When ROE authorize engagement based
solely on status determinations, it represents an inherent invocation of the laws
of war as a source of operational authority, for it is the rules of necessity and
military objective that will provide the parameters for implementing such ROE.
Accordingly, analysis of the nature of the ROE both illuminates the state's
perception of the nature of the operation, and indicates when the forces of the
state will inherently invoke authorities derived from the laws of war. It is
therefore appropriate to focus on the nature of ROE to determine when the
balance of competing interests reflected in the laws of war must apply to a
military operation.
Adding consideration of the nature of ROE to the decision by the state to
employ combat forces in response to a threat provides an effective means of
determining the existence of any armed conflict. Any military operation in which
such authority is granted and exercised must rely, de facto, on the principle of
military objective to determine permissible target engagement. It is therefore
both logical and essential to treat such operations as bringing into force all
foundational principles of the laws of war. Doing so will ensure the armed forces
operate within the framework of essential regulation derived from the history of
warfare; prevent a nonstate enemy from claiming a status or legitimacy
183. See Watkin, supra note 74, at 2-9 (discussing complex challenge of conflict-categorization-
related military operations conducted against highly organized nonstate groups with transnational
reach); Rona, supra note 68 (asserting that "humanitarian law" applies to armed conflict whereas
"human rights law" applies to nonarmed conflict and distinguishing between international and
noninternational armed conflict). See generally ELSEA, supra note 1, at CRS-10 to CRS-16 (analyzing
whether attacks of September 11 triggered law of war); Abbott, supra note 74 (analyzing whether
members of al Qaeda and Taliban can be considered "combatants" per international law).




unjustified by the conflict; and prevent national policymakers from avoiding the
most basic obligations of the laws of war through the assertion of technical legal
arguments devoid of pragmatic military considerations.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR ADOPTION OF THIS NEW LAW-TRIGGERING PARADIGM
Congress unquestionably supported the decision of the President to
characterize the military response to the terror attacks of September 11 as an
armed conflict. 185 While this characterization is the source of continued scholarly
criticism, 186 the United States is unlikely to alter its perspective any time soon,
and the forces called upon to engage terrorist entities will continue to employ
combat power in a manner consistent with this position.
In contrast to the relative clarity of the U.S. characterization of the struggle
against global terror, there continues to be tremendous uncertainty as to the
applicability of the laws of war to this fight. 87 This uncertainty is detrimental to
the execution of these operations because it creates a regulatory void and
imposes upon the armed forces the responsibility to fill this void. In the past,
reliance on military policy to deal with such uncertainty has been generally
effective. 8 8 However, in the post-9/11 era, it has not been uncommon for civilian
185. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (authorizing president to use necessary military force to destroy terrorist threat posed by al
Qaeda and states that sponsor it); Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833
(Nov. 16, 2001) (noting that scale of September 11, 2001 attacks resulted in "state of armed conflict"
requiring use of military forces); cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566, 635 (2006) (reflecting
almost unanimous conclusion among Justices that struggle between United States and al Qaeda is
armed conflict for purposes of international law), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w), as recognized in
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
International terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United
States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property
within the United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the
use of the United States Armed Forces.
Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,833.
186. See Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to Al Qaeda, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 759, 760 (2007)
(stating that, "[u]nder international law, the United States cannot be at 'war' with al Qaeda as such,
much less with a tactic or strategy of 'terrorism,' and the laws of war are not applicable with respect to
acts of violence between members of al Qaeda and armed forces of the United States outside the
context of an actual war, such as the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq").
187. See, e.g., Corn, supra note 3, at 300-10 (noting absence of definitive test to determine when
armed conflict exists, and that such absence can result in uncertainty as to when laws of war are
triggered); Paust, supra note 186, at 760-67 (suggesting that laws of war do not apply to al Qaeda or
9/11 attacks because al Qaeda does not hold status necessary for warfare or armed conflict, although
attacks triggered United States' right to exercise self-defense); Rona, supra note 68 (arguing that laws
of armed conflict, including humanitarian law, are not applicable to "war on terror" except in limited
situations).
188. See Geoffrey S. Corn, "Snipers in the Minaret-What is the Rule?" The Law of War and the
Protection of Cultural Property: A Complex Equation, ARMY LAW., July 2005, at 28, 34-40 (discussing
policy-based application of law of armed conflict principles in accordance with Department of Defense
directives).
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leaders of the military to make policy decisions that are not consistent with
compliance with the principles of the laws of war.189
It is therefore imperative that the United States clearly articulate when the
fundamental principles of the laws of war will apply to military operations that
fail to satisfy the Common Articles 2 and 3 triggering criteria. 19° As explained
above, the evolving nature of warfare has created a necessity for such an
articulation, and the historical purposes of the laws of war support the
application of the law to such situations. 191 Asserting application of this law
based on the pragmatic realities of contemporary military operations will ensure
that the armed forces executing such operations clearly understand their
fundamental obligations and that these operations are guided by an indelible
regulatory framework that balances the authority to employ combat power with
the obligations historically associated with such action.
Assuming the necessity and utility of such a position does not, however,
resolve what the criteria for application should be. It does seem relatively
indisputable that to date there has been an almost myopic effort to fit the Global
War on Terror into the Common Article 2/3 paradigm. As noted above, this has
resulted in uncertainty for military forces and controversy among policymakers
and their critics. 192 Perhaps even more troubling is that it has shifted the focus
from what rules should apply to such combat operations to whether a particular
legal trigger is satisfied. Because of this, and the simple reality that relying on the
Common Article 2/3 paradigm to characterize transnational military operations
directed against nonstate actors is like trying to put the proverbial square peg
into the round hole,1 93 the time has come to adopt a different approach to
determining when the fundamental regulatory framework of the law of war
applies to such operations.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the nature of mission-specific ROE
provides an effective analytical criterion for making such a determination. Quite
simply, the authorization of status-based ROE for a military mission provides a
critical de facto indication that the state is inherently invoking the authority of
the laws of war to guide target selection and destruction decisions. As a result,
linking application of fundamental law of war principles to the authorization of
such ROE ensures that the essential balance between authority and obligation
189. The rebuke to executive wartime authority represented by the decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld is perhaps the quintessential example of this reality. 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by
statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§
948a-950w), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 985 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
190. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the necessity of clear
delineation regarding when the fundamental principles of the laws of war will apply to military
operations not falling within the Common Article 2/3 paradigm.
191. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the evolving nature of
warfare. See supra Part I for a discussion of the historical purposes of the laws of war and why they
support an expansive application.
192. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the confusion resulting
from the attempt to fit the global war on terror into the Common Article 2/3 paradigm.
193. Corn, supra note 3, at 329.
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central to the laws of war is preserved. More importantly, this will ensure the
force and effect of this essential regulatory framework regardless of the
geographic nature of the operations, the nonstate character of the enemy, the
duration of the hostilities, the intensity of the hostilities, or, most significantly,
whether the hostilities satisfy the Common Article 2/3 law-triggering paradigm.
Ironically, the entire emphasis of this law-triggering paradigm supports the
adoption of the ROE-based trigger. As noted above, the objective of the drafters
of the 1949 Conventions was to prevent "law avoidance" as the result of
technical legal definitions and associated arguments.194 For this reason, the focus
of Common Articles 2 and 3 was the creation of a truly de facto law-triggering
standard, immune from the type of technical manipulations so common during
the Second World War. Although the drafters did not anticipate extraterritorial
armed conflict between states and nonstate entities, this does not justify ignoring
the effort to ensure that the laws of war would come into force based primarily
on the existence of armed conflict.
There is perhaps no better de facto indication of the existence of armed
conflict than the authorization of status-based ROE. These ROE permit the
application of destructive combat power based solely on the determination that
the anticipated object of attack is associated with a group or entity that has been
"declared hostile" by national authority. As a result, status-based ROE provide
the most permissive and proactive source of target engagement authority
available for military forces, limited only by the law of war itself. Thus, once such
ROE are authorized, it is the law of war that ipso facto applies to regulate the
use of combat power.
More importantly, consistent with the underlying objective of the Geneva
Conventions, the probability that an ROE-based trigger for law of war
application will be manipulated to avoid application of the law is de minimis.
This is because of one simple reality: the state is unlikely to deprive its forces of
the authority to effectively accomplish a military mission in order to avoid
obligations imposed by the laws of war. Considering the hypothetical use of
combat power to target an al Qaeda base camp in a remote area of another
country illustrates this point. To effectively accomplish this mission, the military
commander will need to engage the "enemy" immediately upon positive threat
identification. While that process may indeed be complex because of the
unconventional nature of the enemy, once identification is made, success will
depend on the unhesitating application of combat power. This can only occur if
the command is operating pursuant to status-based ROE. If the national
authority attempted to avoid law of war application by issuing conduct-based
ROE, it would debilitate operational effectiveness. Accordingly, the cost for law
avoidance would be so profound that it should rarely if ever be a significant
influence on ROE authorization.
It is therefore time for the President to issue an executive or military order
adopting an ROE trigger for application of fundamental law of war principles.
194. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "law avoidance"
purpose of the 1949 Conventions.
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This order should emphasize a number of critical points. First, the United States
has been and will continue to be a leader in the development and application of
the laws of war.195 Second, there is unanimous agreement among the branches of
our government that the struggle against transnational terrorist groups is an
armed conflict, and that this characterization has been endorsed by a number of
allies and international organizations. Third, the United States will continue to
aggressively pursue and target individuals and groups it determines to be
operatives of hostile groups. Fourth, when determined necessary the United
States will employ the full spectrum of combat capabilities to destroy such
targets. Fifth, whenever the military is tasked to conduct such operations
pursuant to status-based mission ROE, the fundamental principles of the laws of
war will apply as a matter of legal obligation irrespective of whether the
operation brings into force other law of war treaty obligations. Sixth, these
principles include military necessity, proportionality, the prohibition against
unnecessary suffering, and the obligation to treat any individual who is hors de
combat humanely. The order should conclude by calling upon all other states to
adopt an analogous position on law of war application.
Perhaps the most controversial military order ever issued by a president in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief was the order establishing the military
commissions. 196 Much of the controversy that order sparked resulted from the
perception that it reflected a lack of respect for the most fundamental
obligations imposed by the laws of war. 19 7 Now is the time to issue an order that
will have a radically different effect; an order that will confirm and advance
those fundamental obligations, and send a powerful message to the international
community that never again will the United States assert authority derived from
the laws of war without acknowledging fundamental obligations. The order
proposed herein will have such an effect.
VII. DISCUSSION OF SOME PRAGMATIC POLICY CONCERNS THAT WILL NEED TO
BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN ANY SUCH ADOPTION
This new triggering paradigm is not without its risks. As described earlier in
the diagram, one of the inputs into ROE is national policy. Policy is by definition
195. Prior presidents have emphasized the important role played by the United States in the
positive development of the laws of war. See, e.g., Letter of Transmittal of Protocol II Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 from Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, to
the United States Senate (Jan. 29, 1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 561, 562 (noting that United States is
generally at forefront of efforts to modify rules of armed conflict); Letter of Transmittal of the Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the Hague
Protocol from William J. Clinton, President of the United States, to the United States Senate (Jan. 6,
1999) (urging ratification of Hague Convention and noting United States will play role in amendments
as party to Convention).
196. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 16,2001).
197. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Retired Generals and Admirals and Milt Bearden in
Support of Petitioner at 9-11, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) (asserting that
respondent's position, in support of President Bush's military order, undermines long-standing
tradition of fidelity to law of war, which is central to U.S. profession of arms).
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a political input. That means that, by definition, ROE are already subject to
political inputs. Naturally, in a nation such as the United States, which strongly
believes that its military must be subject to civilian control, the inputs are not
only important, but necessary. However, it is equally important that ROE
remain a functional tool that the military can apply to achieve the end state
desired by the political leadership.
History has already provided at least one occasion where military leaders
felt the ROE were too constrained to allow military victory. In the midst of the
Vietnam War, President Johnson proudly proclaimed that the military could not
"bomb an outhouse without my approval."'198 Many military leaders chafed
under such controls and argued that this level of review and approval prevented
the military from successfully carrying out its mission.199 Some of this may be the
military leaders not recognizing that the political end state may not always
include a complete military victory and the total destruction of the enemy.
However, there is certainly a valid concern that the ROE can be overpoliticized
at the expense of blood and treasure.
Given that ROE are already a policy issue, this new paradigm could result
in the overpoliticization of the ROE, placing military forces in grave danger. It is
easy to envision a situation where the executive branch might not want to be
seen as going to "war" or taking actions that might trigger the War Powers Act,
regardless of the realities on the ground. In an effort to avoid such a trigger, the
military could be given only self-defense ROE, making the claim that, based on
the ROE, this was less than war and therefore there was no requirement to
report to Congress. The military would then be sent to a hostile environment
with ROE that would not provide sufficient authority to adequately accomplish
the mission, nor possibly provide adequate protections in the face of an armed
enemy. As mentioned above, while this situation is unlikely under current
circumstances due to the short-lived patience of the American people to the
inevitably mounting U.S. casualties that would result, it is still a risk that must be
recognized with the adoption of the new paradigm.
Additionally, there is disagreement currently between the United States
and much of the rest of the world, including the United States' allies, as to the
characterization of the current conflict in Iraq2°° and, to some degree, the
conflict in Afghanistan.20 If manipulating the ROE became an option by either
198. Richard Lowry, Bush's Vietnam Syndrome: The President Draws a Wrong Lesson, NAT'L
REv., Nov. 20, 2006, at 18, 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. at 20, 22.
200. Compare Corn, supra note 188, at 28-34 (noting that United States characterization of
conflict in Iraq was first as belligerent occupation, followed by "'armed conflict' of some character"
still requiring application of laws of war), with Knut D6rmann & Laurent Colassis, International
Humanitarian Law in the Iraq Conflict, 47 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 293, 295-301 (2004) (noting ICRC
position that conflict in Iraq was first an international armed conflict followed by a military
occupation).
201. This has been resolved to some extent by the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557, 628-30 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.
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side to bolster its argument, it may have deleterious effects on the military
members from those countries and would almost certainly hamper
interoperability between the nations' militaries.
Overall, however, this risk is insufficient to preclude the application of the
new paradigm of looking to ROE as a trigger for the type of conflict. Such a
trigger presents an excellent measure of the nature of the conflict and would
present a somewhat objective test that should clarify the nature of the conflict in
the future.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article began with a discussion of the historical underpinnings of the
contemporary law of war. This history provides a proverbial looking glass
through which the logic of this law can be best understood. That logic finds at its
core a simple but critical proposition: warfare and anarchy are not synonymous.
Accordingly, the waging of war has been, and must always be, subject to a
regulatory framework. The laws of war provide that framework.
In an ironic twist of history, the post-World War II efforts to ensure that
war and law operated concurrently in all circumstances has become the basis for
disavowing law-of-war-based obligations in relation to the type of contemporary
transnational conflicts exemplified by the global war on terror. However, as
discussed above, disconnecting armed conflict from a legally based regulatory
framework is both detrimental to warriors and victims of war and inconsistent
with the spirit of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the history they build
upon. 2°2 Accordingly, the time is ripe to reconsider the law-triggering paradigm
that evolved after 1949 in order to ensure that a de facto standard for application
is once again the norm and not considered an aberration.
Asserting the logic of applying law of war principles to all combat
operations does not, however, resolve perhaps the most complicated questions
related to the regulation of conflict to emerge in decades: How does a state
determine what triggers this law outside the Common Article 2/3 paradigm? As
illustrated above, relying on the existing law-triggering criteria is insufficient to
provide an effective answer to this question, even when supplemented by
consideration of analytical factors suggested in the ICRC Commentary. This
insufficiency has led to confusion as to when this law applies to contemporary
operations, criticism of decisions related to its application, and uncertainty for
the armed forces called upon to execute missions against nonstate entities.
The answer to this question, therefore, must be derived from a new
perspective, and it is the perspective of the warrior where it is found. Warriors
understand the difference between conflict and nonconflict operations. This
understanding is not based on the nature of the opponent, the geographic
L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w), as recognized in Boumediene v.
Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 985 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
202. See supra notes 59-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the growing disconnect
between armed conflict and the regulatory framework formed by the Common Article 2/3 paradigm.
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location of the operation, or the scope, duration, or intensity of the operation.
Instead, it is based on the pragmatic and simple reality that authorization to
engage an opponent based solely on a status determination means the line has
been crossed. Thus, for the warrior, the most fundamental indication of armed
conflict is the nature of the ROE issued for the mission.
As explained above, focus on the nature and purpose of ROE supports this
conclusion. Conduct-based ROE, because they are inherently responsive in
nature, indicate an extremely limited use-of-force authority based on self-
defense principles and not on the laws of war. In contrast, status-based ROE
indicate an authority to employ force that is presumptively coextensive with the
laws of war. Accordingly, such ROE implicitly invoke the principle of military
objective to dictate target engagement decisions. Thus, they provide the ultimate
de facto indication of the existence of armed conflict. Accordingly, application of
complementary principles of the laws of war, specifically the prohibition against
the infliction of unnecessary suffering, the doctrine of military necessity, and the
obligation to treat any person who is hors de combat humanely, must apply to
any mission conducted pursuant to status-based ROE.
Focusing on the nature of ROE to determine law-of-war applicability offers
an additional important benefit: it will create a powerful disincentive for the
state to avoid law-of-war obligations by manipulating the characterization of a
given military operation. In order to achieve such avoidance, the state would
have to be willing to deprive its forces of the use-of-force authority necessary to
attack and destroy a target without any actual threat or provocation. Such
decisions are obviously unlikely because of the debilitating effect they would
have on mission accomplishment.
It is therefore time for the United States to reassert its historical role as a
leader in the positive development of the laws of war by adopting this law-
triggering test. This would ideally come in the form of a military order issued by
the president-the same type of order used to create the military commissions.
Unlike that order, however, an order mandating application of fundamental law
of war principles to all operations conducted pursuant to status-based mission
ROE will ensure the humane treatment of victims of armed conflict as a matter
of law. Once such an order is issued, the United States should then press for
adoption of this standard by other states.
Entre armes, sine leges is a flawed concept. History demonstrates that the
effective and disciplined execution of combat operations necessitates a
regulatory framework. The fundamental principles of the laws of war provide
this framework. Depriving warriors of the value of such an important set of
principles-a value validated by hundreds of years of history--on the basis of
technical legal analysis of two treaty provisions is no longer acceptable. Instead,
all warriors must understand that when they "ruck up" and "lock and load" to
conduct operations during which an opponent will be destroyed on sight, the
laws of war go with them. The ROE-based trigger proposed herein will
accomplish such an outcome.
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